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SUPREME COURT
DUFF, AS PIONEER STOCK
POWDER CO. vs. KOONTZ.
No. 5.
Agency - Disputed Authority - Blank
Forms--Written Addition by Agent-Rati-
fication in Part--Action by Principal-
Failure of Consideration - Evidence - Al-
leged Unauthorized Part of Contract Ad-
mitted-Letter of Third Person to Principal
Admitted.
1. Where an agent, using the form
blanks provided by the principal, takes the
third person's written order for goods and
his promissory note in payment therefor,
and as part of the same transaction agrees
to map out territory for the sale of such
goods and signs and delivers a written
agreement "to come and ride, advertise for
and with (said third person) to help sell
and make him safe in (said) bill of goods,"
the principal cannot ratify the written order
and note alone and recover thereon; he must
ratify the entire contract or not at all. To
repudiate part constitutes failure of con-
sideration for which the third person may
rescind the contract, return the goods and
bar the principal's recovery on the note and
order.
2. A note as follows: "No contract or
agreement other than what appears on the
face of this order shall bind the Pioneer
Stock Powder Co.", printed on the order
blank below the line for the purchaser's
signature, does not constitute notice as a
matter of law, but is merely relevant evi-
dence tending to establish actual notice to
the purchaser of the limitation of the
ageni's authority.
3. If the agency or the scope of author-
ity is in dispute, it is not error to admit
evidence of the alleged agent's acts under
instruction of the court that the principal
is not bound by such acts unless the jury
find that agency exists or that the acts
were authorized by the principal, as he
case may be.
4. Where payment and failure of con-
sideration are plead it is not error to admit
in evidence a letter of the third person to
the principal which refers to the enclosures
of check in payment of part of the goods
received and bill of lading for the return
shipment of the balance of such goods and
which also states as reason for so doing
the admitted facts that the principal did not
map out territory and send agent to work
therein as agreed.
5. The function of appellate courts is to
determine errors of law occurring on the
trial and not to consider anew the issues of
fact. Verdicts will not be disturbed on the
mere weight or conflict of the evidence.
Only where there is a total lack of evidence
to support some material element in the
case will a new trial be granted on appeal.
Action in assumpsit by Chas. E.
Duff, doing business in the name and
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style of the Pioneer Stock Powder
Company, against Samuel Koontz.
From a judgment for the defendant
plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Leo J. Hassenauer and Francis J.
Walsh for appellant.
Clifford O'Sullivan and William J.
McGrath for appellee.
VURPULLAT, J. This action was
begun'by the filing of a praecipe in
the Notre Dame Circuit Court de-
claring in the action of special as-
sumpsit. After declaration and affi-
davit of merit were filed the plaintiff
filed amended declaration in two
counts. The facts plead and proven
by way of inducement disclose that
Charles E. Duff, by purchase, assign-
ment and delivery, became the sole
owner of all the notes, contracts,
claims, stock and business of The
Pioneer Stock Powder Company of
Bloomington, Illinois; that he con-
tinued to conduct the business in the
name and style of said company; and
that in that capacity he brought this
action.
The first count of amended declar-
ation is founded on the following
promisory note, to-wit:
$165.00
Walkerton, State of Indiana.
May 10, 1918.
On the 2nd day of September,
1918, we, or either of us, promise to
pay to the order of the Pioneer Stock
Powder Company, One Hundred and
Sixty-five Dollars, value received,
without discount, waiving all our
right to all exemptions allowed us by
law, with interest at 7 per cent. from
maturity if not paid when due or
when presented.
(Signed) Samuel Koontz.
County of St. Joseph.
Witness, F. E. Rohrer.
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The second count is founded on
the following written contract:
Walkerton, Indiana, May 10, 1918.
Pioneer Stock Powder Company,
Bloomington, Illinois.
Pleast ship to Samuel Koontz,
2,000 pounds of Pioneer Stock pow-
ders at six cents per pound. Amount
$120.00. Fifty gallons Pioneer Dip
at $.90 per gallon. Amount $45.00.
On the second day of September
after date, for value received, I
agree to pay One Hundred and Sixty-
five dollars to the order of the Pio-
neer Stock Co., at Bloomington,
Purchaser.
Illinois.
(Signed) Samuel Koontz,
F. E. Rohrer, Salesman.
The note and contract declared on
support but one and the same de-
mand, the note having been given
pursuant to the contract. To this
amended declaration the defendant
filed plea in five counts supported by
affidavit of merit. The first count is
the general issue, the second and
fourth counts plead failure of consid-
eration, the third count payment and
the fifth countpartpayment, and fail-
ure of consideration as to the remain-
der. The second count of plea is
upon the theory of failure of consid-
eration upon facts specially plead.
We believe that the facts and issues
of the case can be best presented by
setting out in full this count which is
as follows:
"And for this second count of plea
to the first and second counts of de-
claration and to each separately and
severally, the defendant says that on
the 10th day of May, 1918, one, Ror-
est E. Rohrer, was acting as a travel-
ing agent for the Pioneer Stock Pow-
der Company and on said day had
full authority from said company to
execute contracts for and in behalf
of said company, and said Rohrer did
act in behalf and for and as agent of
said company at all of the times and
in all things hereinafter complained
of; and on said day sold to the de-
fendant one ton of stock food and ten
jacket cans of fluid, the same being
a food product manufactured and
kept for sale by said company at
Bloomington, Illinois, to be shipped
t osaid defendant billed to Walkerton,
Indiana.
"That at the time of said sale, the
said Pioneer Stock Powder Company,
by its said agent, Rohrer, and the de-
fendant, Koontz, entered into the fol-
lowing written contract, to-wit:
"Walkerton, May 10th. By this I
certify and agreed to come and ride,
advertise for, and with Mr. Samuel
Koontz to help sell and make him
safe in the Pioneer bill of Goods.
Forrest E. Rohrer.
$165.00. Walkerton, State of Indiana,
May 10th, 1918. On the second day
of September after date, we or either
of us, promise to pay to the order of
Pioneer Stock Powder Company, One
Hundred and Sixty-five Dollars. Val-
ue received, with discount or set off,
waiving our rights to all exemptions
allowed us by law, with interest at 7
per cent from maturity, if not paid
when due or when presented. Co. of
Starke.
Witness, F. E. Rohrer.
Samuel Koontz."
"And at the time of the negotia-
tions and at the time said sale was
made, said agent stated to this defen-
dant that the latter was purchasing
the right and would be allowed to
sell the stock food, both barrel and
can product in such territory as the
company would map out for said de-
fendant which said agent stated
would be about up to Stilwell. And
after the execution of said written
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contract, said agent said to this de-
fendant in substance do not sell in
ay territory until the company maps
it out for you and I will let you know
when I come to advertise and help
you sell. And said defendant alleges
that after being signed, such part of
the- contract by said Rohrer signed
was delivered to this defendant, and
such part of the contract signed by
Koontz was delivered to said Rohrer
as agent for said company.
And defendant further- says that
within two weeks after the agree-
ment was made the ton of stock food
was shipped to said Koontz and with-
in a further ten days thereafter the
fluid product was also shipped to him
and all reached him in less than a
month after the sale; and defendant
says that he at once cared for and
housed said products and notified
such Pioneer Stock Powder Company
to come on and outline and lay out
this defendant's territory and ride
and advertise and help sell 'the pro-
duct, but that said company neglect-
ed and refused to allot defendant any
territory and neglected to aid him in
advertising such product, and never
did allot to defendant and territory
or help in any manner to advertise,
sell or make defendant safe in the
Pioneer bill of goods.
That defedant, soon after the re-
ceipt of such product, used one bar-
rel, about 165 lbs., of the stock food
for his own animals as part of the
idvertising agreed upon; but he said
that at the time he so used the same
he believed that the said company
would come on and allot him terri-
tory and would aid him according to
the contract. And the defendant
further says that he has paid the said
company the full value of the stock
food so used. And the defendant
further alleges that he kept such
shipment other than said barrel foi
which he fully paid, from the time
of its receipt by him, safely housed
and stored until the 17th day of July,
1918, when he re3hipped said product
billed to the said Pioneer Stock Pow-
der Company at Bloomington, Illi-
nois. And defendant says that he
has kept and performed all the con-
ditions of such contract so far as he
was permitted to do under the terms
thereof, and was prevented from
complying further by reason of the
acts of the plaintiff, Pioneer Stock
Powder Sompany; but he says that
said Pioneer Stock Powder Co. has
wholly failed and refused to keep
and perform the conditions imposed
upon it by said agreement.
And this the said defendant is
ready to. verify.
Plaintiff's replication was a simi-
liter to the first count and a tender
of the general issue to, the other
counts of plea which was accepted
by defendant. A jury returned a
general verdict for the defendant
together with answers to interroga-
tories. The court overruled the mo-
tion for a new trial and rendered
judgment on the verdict from which
plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.
The errors assigned for reversal
of the judgment are the overruling
of the motion for a new trial, and
that the verdict is contrary to the
evidence and contrary to the law.
One of the causes in support of the
motion for a new trial is the alleged
error in admitting in evidence over
appellant objection the following
writing, being defendant's Exhibit
No. 4, to-wit:
"Walkerton, May 10th. By this I
certify and agree to come and ride,
advertise for, and with Samuel
Koontz to help sell and make him
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safe in the Pioneer Bill of Goods.
Forrest E. Rohrer."
This offered evidence is part of the
contract set out in the second count
of the plea which appellee alleges is
the contract entered into between
himself and the appellant through
the negotiations of appellant's agent,
Forrest E. Rohrer. Appellant con-
tends that his agent had no authori-
ty to enter into such a contract and
that it was therefore error to permit
the introduction of this evidence to
establish such contract.
Whether appellant's agent had or
had not this authority was one of
the important issues to be determin-
ed on the trial; and in this case the
issue was one of fact for the jury and
not one of law for the court. Where
the appointment and authority of an
agent are in writing, or the facts re-
lating thereto are undisputed, it is a
question of law for the court alone
to decide whether agency exists and,
if so, the nature and scope thereof.
But where the authority is not in
writing and the facts are in dispute,
as in this case, it is for the jury to
determine, under proper instructions
of the court, both the existence of
the agency and the character and ex-
tent of the agent's authority. Lou-
don Savings ]Fund Society vs. Hag-
erstown Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St.
496-78 Am. Dec. 390-Mechem's Cases
on Agency 371; Rees vs. Medlock 27
Tax. 120-84 Am. Dec. 611; Gulick vs.
Grover 33 N. J. L. 463- 97 Am. Dec.
728; Seehorn vs. Hall 130 Mo. 257-
32 S. W. 643- 51 Am. St. Rep. 562; I
Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2nd Ed.)
967; Mecham on Agency Sec. 104.
Where the agency is in dispute, it is
not error to admit in evidence state-
ments of the alleged agent under an
instruction of the court that, unless
the jury find the facts necessary to
establish the agency, the principal
will not be bound by such statements.
Wilcox vs. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524-45
S. W. 781-66 Am. St. Rep. 761.
Even if appellant's cantention be
conceded that his ageht did ot have
authority to enter into the contract
in question, or that he exceeded his
authority, yet the contract was prop-
erly admitted in evidence; for the
appellant is bound by such contract
if he ratified what his agent did in
his behalf without authority. Elliott
on Evidence Vol 3, Sec. 1639. The
familiar maxim of agency applies
"Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et
mendato priori aequiparatur." Such
adoptive authority," says Woodward,
J., in Loudon Savings Fund Bank vs.
Hagerstown Savings Bank, supra,
"relates back to the time of the orig-
inal transaction, and is deemed, in
law, the same to all purposes as if it
had been given before." Whether
the appellant did or did not ratify
such contract is also an issue which,
under the disputed facts, must be de-
termined by the jury under the prop-
er instructions of the court. Mecham
on Agency, Sec. 137; Taylor vs. Con-
ner, 41 Miss. 722-97 Am. Dec. 419;
Paul vs. Berry 78 Ill. 157.
If the jury had found that appel-
lant's agent had authority to nego-
tiate the contract in question, or that
such contract entered into without
such authority, was ratified by ap-
pellant, then it would have been re-
versible error for the trial court to
have rejected the admitted evidence
tending to establish part of that con-
tract. Stagg vs. Compton 81 Ind.
171; Stone vs. Sanborne 104 Mass.
201-6 Am. Rep. 238. There was no
error in admitting Defendant's Ex-
hibit No. 4.
Nor was there error in the admis-
sion over appellant's object of de-
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fendant's Exhibit No. 5, which is
also complained of as ground for
new trial. This was a letter of de-
fendant, properly enclosed in a seal-
ed, stamped and addressed envelope
and sent by mail to appellant, calling
attention to the enclosure therewith
of defendant's check in payment of
part of the goods shipped to defend-
ant under the contract, and also to a
bill of lading for the return ship-
ment of the balance of such goods,
and stating as reasons for so doing
that appellant had failed to map out
territory and send its agent to work
with defendant, facts which appellant
admitted on the trial. This letter,
together with the enclosed check and
bill of lading which were also admit-
ted in evidence, constituted direct,
legal, relevant evidence in support of
defendant's plea of payment and
failure of consideration, and, as such,
was clearly admissable in evidence.
Elliott on Evidence Vol. 1, Sec. 144;
Hughes on Evidence 35.
Is the verdict contrary to the evi-
dence? It is a general rule of appel-
late procedure that the verdict of the
jury or finding of the trial court will
not be disturbed merely on the
weight and conflict of the evidence.
Every presumption is indulged in
support of the verdict and the trial
court's rulings. The theory is that
the trial court that heard the testi-
mony of the witnesses and consider-
ed their credibility is more competent
to determine the sufficiency of the ev-
idence to support the verdict when
passing on the motion for a new
trial, than is the court of appellate
jurisdiction which has only the trans-
cript of the record of the trial as a
basis for its decision. Moreover, the
function of the appellate court is not
to decide issues of fact, but to deter-
mine alleged errors of law occur-
ring on the trial. With respect to
the evidence, the appellate court de-
cides merely whether there is any
evidence in the record to sustain the
operative facts on which the verdict
must rest. See Article, New Trial,
Vol. 14, Pg. 768 Enc. of Pldg. & Pr.
Also Article on Appeals, Vol. 2, Pgs.
390-391Id., with citation of cases
from all jurisdictions. Railroad Co.
vs. Wyman 134 Ind. 681-33 N. E.
367.
However, since agency is so much
a question of law or a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, we shall consid-
er the evidence in the light of the
law and determine whether there is
any evidence to support the verdict.
It is elementary in the law of
agency that an agent can bind his
pricipal only to the extent of the au-
thority actually conferred on him by
the principal; and that the agent, in
the exercise of his authority, may
use only such means as are necessary,
proper and usual in accomplishing
the purpose for which the agency
was created. 2 Kent's Com. 620-621;
1 Parsons on Contracts 44-45; Bick-
ford vs. Menier, 107 N. Y. 490-14 N.
E. 438; American Sales Book Co. vs.
Whitaker, 100Ark. 360-140S. W. 132-
37 L.R.A. (NS) 91;Dispatch Printing
Co. vs. National Bank. of Commerce
109 Minn. 440-124 N. W. 236-50 L.
R. A. (NS) 74; Upton vs. Suffolk
County Mills 11 Cush. (Mass.) 586-
59 Am. Dec. 163; Waupaca Elec. Go.
vs. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. Co. 112 Wis.
469-88 N. W. 308; Troy Grocery Co.
vs. Potter 139 Ala. 359-36 S. W. 12;
Lindow vs. Cohn (Cal.) 90 Pac. 485;
Peterson vs. Wood Mach. Co. 97
Iowa 148-66 N. W. 96-59 Am. St.
Rep. 399.
Whether the agent's authority be
express or implied, general or spe-
cial, the party dealing with the agent
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is bound to take notice of the nature
and extent of such authority and
should make inquiry to ascertain the
same. Mecham on Agency, Section
273; Story on Agency, Sec. 125 et seq.
This is true of the commercial trav-
eler's authority, which as a general
rule extends only to soliciting orders
for goods. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Law 224.
What are the facts as disclosed by
the record? That Forest E. Rohrer
was the agent of the appellant is ad-
mitted; and that he had authority to
obtain from appellee, Samuel Koontz,
the note and contract declared on in
this action is, of course, necessarily
admitted. It is also admitted that
said Rohrer had authority to sell to
Koontz the stock powders and dips
of the appellant as consideration for
the note and contract set out in the
amended declaration. But appel-
lant denies that his said agent had
any authority, e.xpress or implied, to
effect such sale to the appellee upon
the further consideration and condi-
tions of agreement alleged in the sec-
ond count of plea.
What authority did appellant's
agent have in the transaction with
appellee, and what notice of such
authority or limitation thereof was
brought to the appellee? The blank
form of contract supplied by the ap-
pellant and used by the agent, Roh-
rer, contained on its face, printed at
the bottom thereof and below the
purchaser's signature, the following
note: "No contract or agreement
other than what appears on the face
of this order shall bind the Pioneer
Stock Powder Company." Is appel-
lee chargeable with notice on account
of this note? If the appellee had ac-
tual notice of the limitation of au-
thority, by having read the note, or
having the same read to him or call-
ed to his attention, he would be bound
by such limitation. Does this note,
as a matter of law, constitute con-
structive notice, binding upon the ap-
pellee in the absence of actual no-
tice? Tothispoint a Wisconsin judge
writes this opinion: "On the face of
the bill sent to the defendant, and di-
rectly under his address, there ap-
pears in large, legible print in red
ink, as if stamped upon it, the words
'Agents not authorized to collect' * " *
If these words so legible and promi-
nent on the face of the bill, would not
be notice, it would seem to be im-
possible to give a purchaser such a
notice. By all authorities he must
be presumed to have observed these
words, and to have had such notice,
where they were so prominent on the
face of the bill of goods in his posses-
sion, and in which he alone was in-
terested as purchaser." Orton, J. in
McKinley vs. Dunham 55 Wis. 515-
42 Am. Rep. 740. Most of the decid-
ed cases on this point, however, do
not go to the extent of holding such
writing to be sufficient in itself as
constructive notice to bind the pur-
chaser, but hold that it is a question
of fact whether or not actual notice
was thereby given the purchaser.
Putnam vs. French 53 Vt. 402-38
Am. Rep. 682; Trainor vs. Morrison
78 Me. 160-57 Am. Rep. 790; Wass
vs. M. M. Ins. Co. 61 Me. 537; Kens-
mann vs. Kershaw 119 Mass. 140;
Law vs. Stokes 32 N. J. L. 249-90
Am. Dec. 655.
We are not disposed to follow the
Wisconsin case doctrine of construc-
tive notice, but prefer to adopt the
holding of the other courts. The law
of constructive notice does not, as a
general rule, apply to such transac-
tions, but leaves the party having
the burden of proving notice in any
case for any purpose, to establish it
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by proof of actual notice; such at-
tempts as this to give written no-
tice having probative force in evi-
dence, according to the nature and
circumstances of the particular case.
In the present case there appears no
evidence whatever tending to estab-
lish actual notice of the provision
printed on the face of the contract
form limiting the authority of appel-
lant's agent to the procurement of
the execution of such printed form
contract. Certain it is that the pro-
vision in question does not constitute
any part of the contract itself; nor
does it prevent the execution of a
valid contract in any other form
within the scope of the agent's au-
thority. This is clearly decided by
the case of Somers vs. Hibbard, Spen-
cer, Bartlett Co. 153 Ill. 102-38 N.
E. 899, where the Supreme Court
says: "The mere fact that appellants
wrote their acceptance on a blank
form for letters at the top of which
were printed the words: 'All sales
subject to strike and accidents,' no
more make these words part of the
contract than they made the words
there prifnted, 'Sommers Bros. & Co.,
Mantifacturers of Box-Annealed
Common and Refined Sheet Iron,' a
part of the contract. The offer was
absolute. The written acceptance
which they themselves wrote was
just as absolute. The printed words
were not in the body of the letter or
referred to therein. The fact that
they were printed at the head of
their letter heads would not have the
effect of preventing appellants from
entering into an unconditional con-
tract of sale." The case of Johns vs.
Jaycox 67 Wash. 403-121 Pac. 854-
1913d Am. Ann. Cas. 471, cited by
appellant, states that the agent's au-
thority can hardly be limited by the
forms of contract he carries, but that
such circumstance and the nature of
the business should put a purchaser
on inquiry.
As part of the contract entered
.into with appellee the appellant, by
itsagent, agreed "to come and ride,
advertise for and with Samuel
Koontz to help sell and make him
safe in the Pioneer bill of goods."
Appellant, assuming this to be a
contract for advertisinghisprincipal's
business, presents the following
point and authority in his brief: "A
traveling salesman's implied authori-
ty does not include authority to con-
tract for advertising his employer's
business." United States Bedding
Co. vs. V. J. Andre (Ark.) 150 S.
W. 413-41 L. R. A. (NS) 1019. This
was a case wherein Andre, a bill
poster of Osceola, brought action to
recover forty-four dollars from the
United States Bedding Co., a mercan-
tile corporation of Memphis, Tenn.,
which had in its employ a traveling
salesman who was authorized to so-
licit orders for and make sales of
goods. This company had a custo-
mer in Osceola to whom it sent large
printed advertisements. It is alleg-
ed that this agent contracted with
this bill poster for posting these bills
for the company. This was the sim-
ple contract; nothing else involved.
Comment by comparison or contrast
is hardly required to show that there
is no analogy in point of fact or prin-
ciple between the two cases. Of
course, the agent of a mercantile
company who is authorized to solicit
orders for and sell goods to mer-
chants, has no authority, express or
implied, to contract with a bill pos-
ter to post bills. Had this agent
contracted with the merchant to pay
for posting these bills as part of the
consideration for the purchase and
sale of his principal's goods, and
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such principal, while refusing to
recognize that part of the contract
to pay for the bill posting, had
brought action to recover for the
price of the goods, then we would
have a case similar to appellant's. As
it is the case cited gives no support
to appellant's appeal.
Appellant also relies on the case
of Johns vs. Jaycox et al, supra. This
case is analogous in the facts of its
original transaction involved. A
selling agent, using a printed form
of contract for the sale of 200 talk-
ing machines, in order to effect a
sale, added to such form of contract
in writing a guaranty that "purchas-
er would sell 25 records on average
to each machine given away four
months from date customer has re-
ceived machine." The court held
that this added provision to the con-
tract of sale was so extraordinary in
character, so foreign to the powers
and purposes of the agency, as not
to bind the principal, and held, in
the purchaser's action against the
principal on the counterclaim, that
the purchaser could not recover on
the guaranty. But in the plaintiff's
branch of the case, which is decided-
ly against appellant's position and
right of recovery in this case, it was
also held that the principal could not
have recovered upon the contract so
executed by its agent, if the purchas-
er had not subsequently in express
terms agreed to waive the unauthor-
ized guaranty and accept the terms
of the original contract as approved
by the principal. It was therefore
solely by reason of the principal's
subsequent express repudiation of
its agent's guaranty to the purchas-
er, and the purchaser's consequent
agreement to accept the talking ma-
chines under the contract without
such guaranty, that the principal
was held entitled to recover. The
case as a precedent therefore is
against appellant. For the same
reason that the principal could not
recover on the contract as executed
by the agent in the case cited, the ap-
pellant cannot recover in this case.
There is nothing extraordinary or
unusual in the authority exercised
by appellant's agent, nor in the na-
ture of the contract entered into with
appellee. It is not an uncommon
thing for a company, in consideration
for the purchase of a large bill of its
-goods, to contract to make the pur-
chaser the exclusive sales agent in a
certain territory, to define such ter-
ritory, and also to agree to ride and
help advertise such goods for the
purpose of introducing them in such
territory. Furthermore there is no
evidence of any express grant of au-
thority which restricted appellant's
agent to negotiating unconditional
sales. As already seen the form
blanks used were not sufficient to do
so. There is ample evidence to sus-
tain the verdice upon the theory that
appellant's agent had such authority
as general agent to make sales as
would authorize the contract entered
into with appellee.
There is also evidence in the rec-
ord to sustain the verdict upon the
theory of ratification. Such ratifi-
cation may be either express or im-
plied. If the principal on being in-
formed of the acts of his agent fails
for an unreasonable length of time
to repudiate the unauthorized acts,
ratification will be presumed as mat-
ter of law 21 R. C. L. 930. Sec. 99;
Union Gold Mining Co. vs. Rocky
Mountain Nat. Bank 96 U. S. 640-24
L. Ed. 648; Brook & Co. vs. Cunning-
ham Bros. (Ga.) 90 S. E. 1037;
Reese vs. Medlock 27 Tex. 120-84
Am. Dec. 611.
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If the jury found that the alleged
agency existed either by appointment
or ratification, then appellant is bar-
red from recovering in this case, be-
cause he does not even pretend to
have furnished the consideration
contracted for under his agent's con-
tract. But there is another propo-
sition of law that absolutely pre-
cludes appellant's recovery in this
case and sustains the verdict of the
jury. Mecham on Agency 89, Sec.
130, says: "It is a fundamental rule
that if the principal elects to ratify
any part of the unauthorized act he
must ratify the whole of it. He can-
not avail himself of it so far as it is
advantageous to him and repudiate
its obligations; and the rule applies
when his ratification is express and
also when it is implied." 2 Corpus
Juris 483 and cases cited; 21 R. C. L.
932, Sec. 111. In the case of Jones
vs. Jaycox, supra, cited by appellant,
involving the extraordinary and un-
authorized warranty added to the
printed forms of contract supplied
the agent, the court said: "There is
no question that, if the principal elect
to ratify a contract which the agent
was not authorized to make, he must
ratify the whole of it. If he ratifies
the contract, he ratifies the warran-
ty." In appellant's case, therefore,
if he ratifies the contract of sale, he
also ratifies the agreement that he
"come and ride and advertise for and
with Samue lKoontz, to help sell and
make him safe in the Pioneer bill of
goods." There is .no other contract
to which the appellee gave his assent
and to which under the law of con-
tract he is bound. A case on this
point, one in every particular analo-
gous to appellant's case is Eberts vs.
Selover 44 Mich. 519-38 Am. Rep.
278.
Since the contract which the agent
of appellant entered into with appel-
lee is the only contract that can be
enforced in this case, and since fail-
ure of consideration for such con-
tract is admitted on appellant's part,
and since recission thereof has been
made by appellee by payment for
and return shipment of the goods re-
ceived, appellant's right of action is
barred. The verdict of the jury is
not, therefore, contrary to law.
Finding no error in the record the
judgment of the trial court is in all
things affirmed.
ST JOSEPH LOAN & TRUST COM-
PANY vs. FIRST NATIONAL
BANK
No. 6.
Negotiable Instruments-Restrictive In-
dorsement - Notice to Purchasers - Pro-
vince of Court and Jury-Instructions--In-
terrogatories.
1. An indorsement as follows: "For
collection, pay to the order of Frank D.
Jones, Cashier" (for the Elkhart National
Bank), is a restrictive or qualified indorse-
ment which not only limits the negotiability
of the check to purposes of collection
merely, while it retains title thereto in the
indorser, but such indorsement constitutes
in itself notice to all subsequent indorsees
and purchasers for value that the party
making the indorsement is the owner of
such check and entitled to the proceeds of
its collection.
2. A bank whcih collects such check,
after receiving it in due course from the
bank to which it was first sent for collec-
tion, cannot apply the proceeds of collection
to the liquidation of a balance due from
that bank, by virtue of their existing agree-
ment and practice to collect and credit to
their respective accounts commercial paper
sent to one another instead of remitting
such proceeds to the sending bank, for the,
sending bank having no title to such check
or proceeds, the collecting bank can acquire
none.
3. The bank which collects a check, so
indorsed is liable to the bank which so in-
dorsed it, in the action of indebtitatus
assumpsit for money had and received, and
it is no defense to such action that there is
no actual privity of contract or legal rela-
tion between such banks.
4. A tendered instruction which correct-
ly states the law of a case where the check
negotiated for collection has upon it an un-
qualified indorsement. is properly refused
in a case where the indorsement is a re-
strictive one "for collection"; for in the lat-
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ter case the facts that such check was
transferred for collection only and that the
collecting bank had notice thereof, are de-
terminde by the court's construction of the
indorsement as a matter-of law, and are
therefore not facts for the jury to deter-
mine as in the other case.
5. Interrogatories which elicit facts
that are immaterial or tend only to contra-
dict the court's construction of a written
indorsement are properly refused.
Action for money had and receiv-
ed, brought by the First National
Bank of Chicago, against the St. Jo-
seph Loan & Trust Co., of South
Bend, Indiana. From a judgment
for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Francis J. Murphy and Walter R.
Miller for Appellant.
Delbert D. Smith and Edward
Madigan for Appellee.
VURPILLAT, J. The appellee,
plaintiff, First National Bank of Chi-
cago, being the owner of two certain
checks for $500 each, indorsed them
as follows: "For collection, pay to
the order of Frank D. Jones, Cash-
ier," said Jones being-the cashier of
the Elkhart National Bank to which
appellee sent the checks for collec-
tion. The Elkhart National Bank in-
dorsed the checks by general indorse-
ment, making them payable to the
appellant, the St. Joseph Loan &
Trust Company. There existed at
that time and for a long time prior
thereto an agreement and practice
between the Elkhart National Bank
and the St. Joseph Loan & Trust
Company by which they mutually
collected all the commercial paper
forwarded to one another, and in-
stead of remitting the proceeds of
such collection, credited and charged
the same to their respective accounts.
The appellee collected the checks in
question and, pursuant to said agree-
ment, credited the proceeds thereof
to the Elkhart National Bank, which
was at that time, and ever since has
been, heavily indebted to the St. Jo-
seph Loan & Trust Company in a
large balance on their said account,
towit: $3,000. The Elkhart Nation-
al Bank became insolvent and has
not paid to the appellee the one
thousand dollars on the checks thus
collected.
The appellee thereupon instituted
this action against the appellant for
money had and received on the two
checks which it had forwarded to the
Elkhart National Bank, having first
made demand upon appellant, St. Jo-
seph Loan & Trust Company, for
such money which was refused. To
the complaint appellant filed answer
in two paragraphs, general denial
and confession and avoidance. The
second paragraph of answer was
stricken out. The cause was submit-
ted to a jury which returned a gen-
eral verdict together with answers
to interrogatories. Judgment was
rendered on the verdict in favor of
the plaintiff from which defendant
appeals.
The errors assigned are the over-
ruling of the demurrer to the com-
plaint, the striking out of the sec-
ond paragraph of answer, overrul-
ing the motion for a new trial and
that the verdict is contrary to law.
The first two of the alleged errors
are not discussed by appellant's
counsel in their briefs and are there-
fore waived according to the rules of
the appellate courts. However, the
complaint for money had and receiv-
ed is in the common form prescribed
and sufficiently alleges all operative
facts, including demand and refusal,
to constitute a cause of action. 14
Enc. of Pleading & Practice 53, and
cases there cited. And the second
paragraph of appellee's answer was
properly stricken out as a sham
pleading. 20 Enc. of Pldg. & Pr. 1;
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Brown County Bank vs. Lewis 18
Wend. (N. Y.) 566; Beeson vs Mc-
Connaha 12 Ind. 440.
The verdict of the jury is not con-
trary to law. The law of negotiable
paper is the law of this case., The
checks in question are negotiable in-
struments, and the construction
which the court, as a matter of law,
must give to the indorsement placed
on the checks by the appellee, is de-
cisive of the rights of the parties and
of the issues in this case. The in-
dorsement, "For collection, pay to the
order of Frank D. Jones, Cashier"
(of the Elkhart National Bank), is a
restictive or qualified indorsement
which not only operates to limit the
negotability of the checks to purpos-
es of collection merely, while it re-
tains title thereto in the indorser,
but such indorsement constitutes of
itself notice to all subsequent in-
dorsees and purchasers for value,
that the party making such indorse-
ment is the owner of such checks and
entitled to the proceeds of their col-
lection. 1 Daniel on Negotiable In-
struments, Sec. 698; Edwards on
Bills & Notes, Sec. 277; Bank of the
Metropolis vs. First National Bank
of Jersey City 19 Fed. 301; First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago vs. Reno
County bank 3 Fed. 257; White vs.
National Bank 102 U. S. 658; Claf-
lin vs. Wilson 51 Iowa 15.
In the case of Bank of Metropolis
vs. First National Bank, supra, the
indorsement was, "For collection,
pay to the order of 0. L. Baldwin,
cashier," which in every detail is
like the indorsement here. In First
National Bank vs. Reno County
Bank, supra, the indorsement was,
"Pay to the order of Hetherngton &
Co., on account of the First Nation-
al Bank, Chicago." Concerning
these two indorsements, the Federal
court in the latter case says: "Under
either form of indorsement the nat-
ural and reasonable implication to
all persons dealing with the paper
would seem to be that the owner has
authorized the endofsee to collect it
for the owner, and conferred upon
him a qualified title for this purpose
and for no other."
Appellant contends that it became
the owner of the checks in due course
and for value; that by virtue of the
Elkhart National Bank's general in-
dorsement, it became prima facie the
owner of the checks, and that, by
reason of its agreement and practice
with said bank, in applyng the pro-
ceeds of the collecton of the checks
to the existing debt of said bank, it
was a purchaser for value and enti-
tled to a lien on such proceeds no
matter who was the owner of the
checks. The case of the Bank of the
Metropolis vsl New England Bank,
1 Howard 234-11 L. Ed. 234 is cited
in support of the contention. The
facts of the tvo cases are analogous
with the material exception that in
the case cited the New England
Bank, in sending its check to the
Commonwealth Bank for collection,
did so by a general indorsement
which, in legal effect, transfers an
unqualified and perfect title; while
in appellant's case, the appellee, the
First National Bank, in sending the
checks in question to the Elkhart
National Bank for collection, did so
by a restrictive indorsement, which,
in legal effect, transfers only a qual-
ified title "for collection." In the
case cited the Bank of the Metropo-
lis could become an innocent pur-
chaser for value without notice of
the New England Bank's claim, and
could therefore apply them to the ac-
count of the Commonwealth Bank
under ther agreement; but appellant,
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St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co., could
not become a purchaser without no-
tice of appellee's claim, because the
restrictive indorsement itself was
notice to appellant that appellee had
retained its title to the checks and
the proceeds of their collection, and
that appellee could acquire no better
title han had been transferred to the
Elkhart National Bank, to-wit: Title
"for collection" only.
In the case of the First National
Bank vs. Reno County Bank, supra,
which involves the restrictive in-
dorsement and is in all respects anal-
ogous to appellant's case, and in
which the same contention was made
and the same case cited in support
thereof, the U. S. Circuit Court
makes this distinction: "It will be
seen that the case (Bank of Metrop-
olis vs. New England Bank) was de-
cided upon the ground that the pa-
per was indorsed so as to show,
prima facie, a perfect title in the in-
dorsee, thus enabling the latter to
use it as its own, and to get credit on
the faith of absolute ownership. It
is clear that had the indorsement
been restricted in its sharacter, so
as to show the continued ownership
of the New England Bank, the re-
sult would have been different."
And in another part of the opinion
the same court says: "The defend-
ant's (Appellee's) claim, that it had
a right to apply the proceeds of the
checks collected by it to the liquida-
tion of the claim against the Mastin
(Elkhart National) Bank, is entirely
without merit. There is not a shad-
ow of ground for holding that the
defendant believed the paper belong-
ed to the Mastin (Elkhart) Bank.
The indorsement of that bank de-
clares in plain words "for collection,"
so that the defendant (appellee) wad
definitely informed that the Mastin
(Elkhart) Bank did not own the
check."
To sustain appellant's contention
the court would be compelled to ex-
pressly overrule the decision of the
United States Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York in
the case of Bank of Metropolis vs.
First National Bank of Jersey City,
supra. After stating the facts of
that case, which are in perfect anal-
ogy to the facts of this case, that
court says: "Upon these facts it is
clear that the relations between the
defendant and the Newark Bank in
respect to paper received by the for-
mer from the latter for collection
were those of debtor and creditor,
and not merely of agent and princi-
pal, (Morse, Banks, 52) and the de-
fendant, having received the paper
with the right to appropriate its pro-
ceeds upon general account as a cred-
it to offset or apply to any indebted-
ness existing or to accrue from the
Newark Bank growing out of the
transactions between the two banks,
was a holder for value. Since the de-
cision in Swift vs Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, it
has been the recognized doctrine of
the federal courts that one who ac-
quires negotiable paper in payment
or as security for a pre-existing in-
debtedness is a holder for value,
(Nat. Bank of the Republic vs.
Brooklyn city, etc., R. Co. 14 Blatchf.
242, affirmed, 102 U. S. 14), and if
the defendant had been justified in
assuming that such paper was the
property of the Newark Bank, it
would have been entitled to a lien
upon it for a balance of account, no
matter who was the real owner of
the paper. Bank of Metropolis vs.
New England Bank, 1 Howard 234.
But the checks bore the indorsement
of the plaintiff in a restricted form.
signifying that the plaintiff had nev-
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er parted with his title to them. In
the terse statement of Gibson, C. J.,
'a negotiable bill or note is a courier
without luggage; a memorandum to
control it, though indorsed upon it
would be incorporated with it and
destroy it' Overton vs. Tyler, 3 Pa.
St. 348. The indorsement by plain-
tiff 'for collection' was notice to all
parties subsequentl dealing with
the checks that the plaintiff did not
intend to transfer the title of the pa-
per, or the ownership of the pro-
ceeds, to another. As was held in
Cecil Bank vs. Bank of Maryland,
22 Md. 148, the legal import and ef-
fect of such indorsement was to no-
tify the defendant that the plaintiff
was the owner of the checks, and
that the Newark Bank was merely
its agent for collection."
Nor can appellant's contention
prevail that there is no privity of
contract or other legal relation be-
tween appellant and appellee in this
case, for, as stated by the court in
the case of the Metropolis vs. First
National Bank, supra, "It has long
been settled that want of privity is
no obpection to the action of indebt-
itatus assumpsit for money had and
received. See note A, appendix, 1
Cranch 367 (2 L. Ed. 139), where
the authorities are collated." The
doctrine applicable to the action for
money had and received is announc-
ed by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts in Hall vs. Marston, 17
Mass. 574-579 as follows: "When-
ever one man has in his hands the
money of another, which he ought to
pay over, he is liable to this action
(assumpsit) although he has never
seen nor heard of the party who has
the right. When the fact is proved
that he has the money, if he cannot
show that he has legal or equitable
ground for retaining it, the law
creates the privity and the promise."
This doctrine as here stated is ex-
pressly approved in First National
Bank of Chicago vs. Reno County
Bank, supra.
Appellant alleges as cause for new
trial the refusal to give the following
instruction properly tendered, to-wit:
If you find from the evidence that
the Elkhart National Bank did for
a period of years transact business
with the defendants, the St. Joseph
Loan & Trust Company of South
Bend, Indiana; and did from time to
time transmit notes and other com-
mercial paper to the said defendants
for collection, which were treated by
both parties as the property of the
other, unless an indorsement on such
paper was of such a nature as to con-
vey notice as to the outstanding
equity in such negotiable paper by a
third person; and if you find that the
checks in this case were transmitted
in the ordinary course of business
between the two banks aforesaid and
were held by the defendant, and while
thus held, the said Elkhart National
Bank became insolvent, and that
there was at that time a large bal-
ance on general account due said de-
fendants, the St. Joseph Loan &
Trust Company, from said Elkhart
National Bank; and that in the col-
lection of such negotiable paper from
one another the said banks would not
remit the proceeds to the transmit-
ting bank in each particular instance,
but instead would debit and credit
each other, as the case might be, in
a book called a collection register;
and that at the time of the insolvency
of the said Elkhart National Bank,
the balance due defendants from said
Elkhart National Bank by reason of
such collections, was an amount in
excess of the amount of the checks
collected, to-wit: $3,000; therefore
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
you must find for the defendant and
against the plaintiff, since said de-
fendant is entitled to the proceeds
of such collection until such balance
is paid."
The appellant again relies on the
case of the Bank of Metropolis vs.
New England Bank, supra, in which
the refusal of the trial court to give
a similar instruction was held to
constitute reversible error. In both
cases the plaintiff banks had the bur-
den of proving that the checks had
been transferred by them for the
purpose of collection only, and that
the collecting banks received the
checks with notice of that fact. In
the case cited it was the province of
the jury to determine these facts un-
der proper instructions of the court,
because the indorsement on the
check, being general, passed perfect
title to the check and conveyed no no-
tice whatever of the indorsing bank's
claim. It was therefore error to re-
fuse the instruction which properly
stated the law applicable to the facts
of that case. In appellant's case,
however, the facts that appellee ne-
gotiated its checks "for collection"
only, and that appellant had notice
thereof, were established by the re-
stricted indorsement itself which it
was the duty of the court alone to
construe as a matter of law, and such
facts thus established could not be
submitted to the jury for finding.
The instruction, therefore, had no
application to this case and was pro-
perly refused. Indeed, had the judg-
ment been for appellant, it would
have constituted reversible error to
have given it.
Appellant also complains of the
trial- court's refusal to submit to the
jury two certain interrogatories.
Neither of these had material appli-
cation to the issues, and both tended
to contradict the legal effect of the
limited indorsement, and were there-
fore properly refused.
There is no error in the trial
court's record and the judgment of
the Notre Dame Circuit Court is
therefore affirmed.
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BRIEF OF LEO J. HASSENAUER in CASE OF DUFF AS
PIONEER STOCK POWDER CO. vs. KOONTZ.
In the Notre Dame Supreme Court.
Chas. E. Duff, doing business under
the name and style of The Pioneer
Stock Powder Company, Appel-
lant,
VS.
Samuel Koontz, Appellee.
Brief for Appellant.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an action in special assump-
sit, by which the plaintiff seeks
judgment against the defendant for
damages alleged to have been sus-
tained by him on account of a breach
of contract, the non-payment of a
note given for the purchase of stock
powders and dips, and assigned to
plaintiff, upon becoming the sole
owner of The Pioneer Stock Powder
Company.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
The issues as formed consisted of
the declaration in two counts; the
first count alleging that the plaintiff
became sole owner of the Pioneer
Stock Powder Company, and all ac-
counts and notes due the said com-
pany, by an assignment without re-
course from the former owner. That
he is the sole owner of a promissory
note, set out in the declaration, exe-
cuted to the company and signed by
the defendant, Samuel Koontz. That
said note is due and unpaid. And for
his second count, plaintiff ileges that
the defendant, and plaintiff by his
agent entered into a certain agree-
ment in which defendant agreed to
buy and pay for a certain amount of
powders and dips, products of The
Pioneer Stock Powder Co., and plain-
tiff agreed to sell and ship the same.
That plaintiff has wholly performed
his part of the agreement. That up-
on demand defendant failed to pay
as per the signed agreement.
The defendant filed a general de-
murrer which was overruled; defen-
dant then filed a plea in five counts
to which the plaintiff files a similiter
and replication to the 2nd, 3rd, and
fourth counts of plea. The jury
broukht in a verdict for defendant.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for new
trial in four paragraphs which was
deniel by the court. Whereupon the
plaintiff doth appeol to the court of
last resort.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. That the verdict is contrary to
the evidence;
2. That the verdict is contrary to
the law and evidence;
3. The court erred in overruling
plaintiff's motion for new trial.
Condensed statement of the evi-
dence. (Omitted from publication.)
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. "A party dealing with the
agent must ascertain the scope and
reach of the power delegated to such
agent, and must abide by the conse-
quences if he transcends them."
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank vs
Butchers & Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y.
125 69 Am. Dec. 678; Monson et al.
vs Kill, 33 N. E. 43 (Ill.) 242 Ill. 434-
90 N. E. 298; Hartensbower et al. vs.
Uden et al. 28 L. S. A. NS. 738.
2. "A traveling salesmanp im-
plied authority does not include au-
thority to contract for advertising
his employer's business." (Ark.)
150 S. W. 413; United States Bed-
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ding Company, vs. V. J. Andre, 41
L. R. A. NS. 1019.
3. The law in relation to the
agent's authority is thus stated in 6
Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, page 224:
Sec. 1. "The scope of a commercial
traveler's authority is well defined,
and as a general rule, extends only
to the soliciting of orders for goods."
Sec. 2. "Third parties dealing
with him are bound, at their peril to
ascertain his real powers; and the
mere statement of the salesman that
he is authorized to do any unusual
act will not be sufficient o bind the
principal."
4. "While a selling agent's author-
ity cannot be limited by the form of
blank contracts he carries, such con-
tracts and the nature of the business
may be sufficient to put the purchaser
on inquiry." John vs. Jaycox, 67
Wash. 403-121 Pac. 854-Anno. Cases.
5. Judge Story, Commentaries on
the law of Agency, Sec. 126, Sec. 133.
"Where the agency is not held out
by the principal, by any acts, or de-
clarations, or implications, to be gen-
eral in regard to the particular act
or business it must from necessity be
construed according to its real na-
ture and extent; and the purchaser
must act at his own peril, and iF
bound to inquire into the nature and
extent of the authority actually con-
ferred. In such a case there is no
ground to contend that the principal
ought to be bound by the acts of the
agent, beyond what he has apparent-
ly authorized; because he has not
misled the confidence of the other
party, who has dealt with the agent.
"The duty of inquiring, then, is in-
cumbent on such party,since the prin-
cipal has never held the agent out as
having any general authority what-
soever in the premises; and, if he
trusts without inquiry, he trusts to
the good faith of the agent, and not
to that of the principal."
ARGUMENT
The appellant's 1st, 3rd, and 5th
paragraphs of Points and Authori-
ties are considered together in his ar-
gument.
The evidence discloses these par-
ties had no usual course of dealing
between themselves. It is clear un-
der the facts in this record that in-
stead of anything appearing to cause
the defendant to believe the contract
was one within the agent's apparent
authority, as being usual and ordin-
ary in the course of such business,
the case of an extraordinary and un-
usual proposition is presented, so
unreasonable and so entirely repug-
nant to the usual course of conduct
pursued by business concerns that
this defendant being governed by the
standard of an ordinarily prudent
business man must have known, and,
in fact, every reasonable inference
from the proof shows that he might
have known the authority of the
salesman to that extent was improba-
ble. He should therefore be pre-
cluded from asserting the apparent
authority of the ageht to make the
contract, which, if made, and was
binding in every case ,would proba-
bly result in entailing bankruptcy
upon the most stable manufacturers
and wholesalers who attempted to
sustain their credit by abiding such
conditions.
Now, it is certain a salesman hav-
ing no express authority to enter into
such a contract, his principal can
only become obligated by the act of
the agent in that behalf upon one of
two theories. First, the principal
would be bound on the doctrine of
ratification; or, secondly, the princi-
pal would, of course, be bound by the
act of the agent if the contract made
by him was within the apparent
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scope of the agent's authority. This
responsibility of the principal for the
acts his agent, not expressly autlhor-
ized, is limited however, to such acts
as are within the apparent scope of
the authority conferred; that is to
say, it is implied, of course, that an
agent on the road, such as a travel-
ing salesman, for the sale. of goods
to various persons, has the authority
to employ all the necessary and prop-
er means for the accomplishment of
the sale which are justified by and
consistent with the usages of th.e
trade. The law presumes, and those
dealing with the agent have the right
to act upon this presumption of the
law, that the agent is authorized to
sell the goods in the usual manner,
and only in the usual manner, and
make such contracts thereabout as
are reasonable or competent with the
usage and custom of the trade in like
undertakings, and it is to this extent
and this extent only that an agent
may be said as a matter of law to be
acting within the scope of his appar-
ent authority. That it is the duty of
third persons dealing with the agent
in contracts of this nature to inquire
as to the extent of his authority. 6
6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, page
224.
Judge Story, Commentaries on the
Law of Agency, Sec. 126, Sec. 133.
Monson et al. vs. Kill,. 33 N. E. 43.
Hartenbower et al. vs. Uden et al.
28 L. R. A. NS .738.
Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank vs.
Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 69 Am.
Dec. 678.
Therefore, if the authority which
the traveling salesman assumes to
exercise in and about the consumma-
tion of the sale of such goods is of
such an unusual, improbable and ex-
traordinary character as would be
sufficient to place a reasonably pru-
dent business man in dealing with
him, upon his guard, the party so
dealing will not be justifiefifid flinSfi
dealing will not be justified in disre-
garding his senses and overlooking
the real situation and thereafter seek
to hold the principal, upon the theory
that the contract was within the
agent's apparent scope of his author-
ity. Under such circumstances it is
the duty of the party dealing with
the agent to either refuse to close ne-
gotiations with him at all, or first
proceed to ascertain from the prin-
cipal whether the true scope of his
authority is such as will authorize
the extraordinary and unusal cuon-
tract proposed. The principal last
mentioned, not only comports with
the ends of justice sought to be at-
tained by the established law of prin-
cipal and agent, but is in fact one of
the fundamentals of our entire sys-
tem of jurisprudence.
The further question to be decided
is: A traveling salesman's implied
authority does not include authority
to contract for advertising his em-
ployer's. business or goods. The de-
cision finds support in the one report-
ed case Which has been found. In
United States Bedding Company vs.
V. J. Andre, 41 L. R. A. NS. 1019,
the material facts were:
The defendant had in its employ a
traveling salesman who was author-
ized to solicit orders for and make
sales of goods. Among its customers
was a retail firm to whom, in ship-
ping goods, it also sent out large pos-
ters, those advertisements which
could be posted on bill boards. The
plaintiff claimed that he had entered
into a contract with defendant's
salesman whereby he was employed
to post said advertisements on his
bill-boards. The defendant denied
that such contracts were entered into
by its salesmen, and blaimed that if
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it was, he was unauthorized to make
it.
The just court of Arkansas, ren-
dered the following decision in the
above reported case:
"The agent's implied authority is
limited to those acts which are of
like kind with the very act he is ex-
pressly empowered to do, and from
which the authority is implied; but
his authority can never be extended
by implication to do an act or make
an agreement which is beyond the
obvious purpose of his employment.
The purpose fo rwhich a traveling
salesman is employed is to solicit or-
ders and make sales of goods. Un-
less he is specially authorized to do
so, he has no implied authority to do
any act other than is usually done by
other salesmen of like character;
that is, to do those things and make
those agreements which are neces-
sary and usual to accomplish the
purpose of the agency. Being em-
ployed for one purpose, he has no
authority to do another, either actual
or implied.
This learned court further held:
"The power to make contracts for
advertising cannot be implied from
the power to sell goods and solicit
orders, and therefore it is not within
the apparent scope of the authority
of the traveling salesman in this case
to make. Aperson dealing with an
agent is at once put upon notice of
the limitation of his authority, and
must ascertain what that authority
is.,
In concluding the court said:
"As a matter of law, therefore, the
power to make the contract was not
within the apparent scope of the
agent's authority."
A further extraordinary feature
about this transaction is that the de-
fendant, Samuel Koontz, freely con-
tracted with the agent regardless of
inquiry concerning the blank form of
contract which the agent carried, the
production of an extra blank after
the stereotyped form had been filled
out and signed should have put the
defendant, Samuel Koontz, on his
guard regarding the signing of a sep-
arate contract different from the
stereotyped form signed at the con-
summation of the original contract.
In the case of John vs. Jaycox,
(Wash.) 121 Pac. 854-1913 D 471,
Am. & Eng. Anno. Case. the mater-
ial facts were:
An action was brought to recover
a balance due upon a written con-
tract for two hundred talking ma-
chanes, sold by the plaintiff's agent.
The agent caused the defendant to
execute a written form of contract
which he carried and for executing
the same the agent gave defendant a
written guaranty that they would sell
a certain amount of machines each
week. The appellants contend that
the memorandum was never a part
of the contract because the agent had
no authority to make it.
The court in deciding the main
question said in part as follows:
"While an agent's authority can
hardly be limited by the form of
blanks he carries, that circumstance
and nature of the business should
put a purchaser on inquiry. The ap-
parent scope of his authority was
that of a sales agent, and it is upon
the powers implied by that relation
that any souhd decision must rest. To
hold, as contended by counsel, that
the appellant, without knowledge, or
ratification, should be estopped to
question the guaranty because the
respondents had placed themselves,
in a position where they must have
the machines in reliance upon the
quaranty, would be to hold that the
principal would be bound in almost
every instance by the unauthorized
acts of the agent however palpably
beyond the scope of his employment."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the appellant believes
he is entitle dto a judgment on two
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theories; that a traveling salesman
may not obligate his principal, as
within the scope of his apparent au-
thority, by a positive agreement or
contract in connection with the sale
of goods, which agreement or con-
tract was without the scope and be-
yond his express authority, and
which was not an ordinary or usual
contract, comporting with any cus-
tom or usage of the trade; that it was
the duty of the appellee, to ascertain
the extent and scope of the agen's
auhority upon being asked to execute
two different and dissimilar con-
tracts relating to the same subject
matter in question.
Wherefore the appellant prays
that the learned Supreme Court of
Notre Dame will remand the case to
the trial Court with instructions to
grant the appellant a ne wtrial.
Respectfully submitted to the
Honorable, the Supreme Court of
Notre Dame, Indiana, for just con-
sideration and solution.
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BRIEF OF CLIFFORD O'SULLIVAN IN CASE OF DUFF
AS PIONEER STOCK POWDER CO. vs. KOONTZ.
In the Notre Dame Supreme Court.
Chas. E. Duff, doing business under
the name and style of The Pioneer
Stock Powder Company, Appel-
lant,
VS.
Samuel Koontz, Appellee.
Brief for Appellee.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an action in special assump-
sit by which the plaintiff seeks judg-
ment against the defendant for dam-
ages alleged to have been sustained
on account of breach of contract, the
non-payment of a note alleged to
have been given for the purchase of
Stock Powders and Dips, and assign-
ed to plaintiff upon his becoming the
sole owne rof The Pioneer Stock
Powder Company.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
The plaintiff filed a declaration in
two counts to which the defendant
filed a general and special 'demurrer.
The court sustained the demurrer
and the plaintiff then filed an amend-
ed declaration in two counts; the
first count alleging that the plaintiff
became the sole owner of The Pio-
neer Stock Powder Company and all
accounts and notes due the said
company. That he is sole owner of
note set out in declaration. That
said note is due and unpaid.
And for his second count, the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant
and the plaintiff by his agent enter-
ed into a certain agreement in which
the defendant agreed to buy for a
certain amount of powders and dips,
products of the plaintiff company
and the plaintiff agreed to sell and
ship the same. That the plaintiff
has wholly performed his part of the
agreement. That upon demand de-
fendant failed to pay as per the al-
leged agreement.
The defendant then filed his plea
in five counts. The first count was a
general traverse. In his second
count the defendant pleads a written
contract, set out in plea, entered into
by The Pioneer Stock Powder Com-
pany through its agent, whereby it
was agreed that, if the defendant
would take a certain amount of the
products of the said company, he
would be buying the right and would
be allowed to sell the products, and
that the company would map out for
him a certain territory in which he
was to work, and that the company
would send its agent to help him sell
and advertise the said products.
That the defendant was to do noth-
ing until the company should send
its agent. That said written agree-
ment was part of the orgiinal con-
tract of which the note was a part
and that The Pioneer Stock Powder
Company's promise to help sell the
products and to send its agent and
to map out a territory in which the
defendant was to work was the sole
and only consideration for his, the
defendant's, signing his promissory
note.
The defendant further alleges that
the goods were shipped to him and
that he housed them and cared for
them and waited for the Pioneer
Stock Powder Company to send its
agent and to map out a territory in
which he was to work. That he sent
a letter to the Company requesting
them to send its agent. That The
Pioneer Stock Powder Company nev-
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er did send its agent and never did
map out a territory for him as per
the agreement. That he shipped the
goods back to the Pioneer Stock Pow-
der Company. That he has wholly
performed his part of the contract
so far as he was permitted to do and
was prevented from complying fur-
ther by reason of the acts of the
plaintiff, but he says that The Pio-
neer Stock Powder Company has
wholly failed and refused to keep
and perform the conditions imposed
on it by the said agteement. Where-
fore the defendant says that he has
received no part of the consideration
for the execution of the contract sued
upon.
The defendant alleged payment
and failure of consideration for his
third, fourth, and fifth count of his
plea.
To the defendant's plea the plain-
tiff filed a replication to the second,
third, fourth, and fifth counts and a
similiter to the first. TTie jury
brougth in a verdict for the defend-
ant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a
new trial which was denied by the
court. Judgment was rendered and
this appeal was brought.
Evidence. (Omitted from publi-
cation.)
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. "Express authority of an agent
is that which the principal directly
grant sto him and this includes im-
plication whether the agency be gen-
eral or special all such powers as are
necessary and proper as a means of
effectuating the purpose for which
the agency was created."
Dispatch Printing Company vs.
National Bank of Commerce, 109
Minn. 440, 124 N. W. 236, 50 L. R A.
N. S.) 74.
2. "Express authority permits
the agent to adopt any recognized
usage or mode of dealing."
Kaufman vs. The Farley Mfg. Co.
78 Ia. 679; 43 N. W. 612, 16 A. S. R.
462.
Duncan vs. Hartman, 143 Pa. St.
595, 22 Atl. 1099, 24 A. S. R. 570.
Rohrbough vs. U. S. Express Co.
40 S. E. 398, 88 A. S. R. 849.
3. "If the principal on being in-
formed of the acts of the agent fails
to disavow them within a reasonable
time hi ssilence may be considered
and as an acquiescence and assent to
the acts done and ratification will be
presumed."
Union Gold Mining Co. vs. Rocky
Mountain Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 640, 24
L. Ed. 648; Brook vs. Cunningham,
(Ga.) 90 S. W. 1037; Eau Claire-
Canning Co. vs. Western Brokerage
Co., 213 Ill. 561-73 N. E. 430; Whit-
ley vs. Jones (Ga.) 49 S. E. 600.
ARGUMENT
The counsel for the appellant has
in his excellent brief confined the ar-
gument in support of his contention
to two theories. First that the act
of the agent in executing the contract
with appellee was not within the im-
plied or apparent scope of his author-
ity and therefore the principal is not
bound by such contract; and second-
ly that the contract in question was
so unreasonable and so repugnant to
the usual course of conduct pursued
by business concerns that the defend-
ant was bound to inquire into the ex-
tent of the agent's authority before
executing such a contract.
As to the first point we must com-
pliment the learfied counsel for his
very masterful treatise of the law on
the question of the implied powers of
an agent and the apparent scope of an
agent's authority. However, from
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an examination of the facts as dis-
closed in the record it is apparent
that all his lengthy argument is en-
tirely beside the issue and for this
reason it will not be our purpose to
attempt to refute the points and au-
thorities that he has cited on the
question of implied and apparent
scope of authority but to show where
these decisions and rules of law are
entirely foreign to the *issue and can
have no application to the questions
and facts involved in this case.
He has proceeded upon the theory
that the acts of the agent in question
could only be considered as being
within the implied powers of the
agent, and has assumed in direct con-
flict with the evidence in the case that
there was no express authority grant-
ed to the agent. The defendant in
the trial of the case in the lower
court never contended or attempted
to show that the agent was acting
within his implied authority but con-
tended and proved that the agent
had express authority to enter into
such a contract on behalf of his prin-
cipal. The best and most competent
evidence that can be adduced to show
the existence of an agency and to
show the nature of such agency is
the testimony of the principal for
whom the agent acted. In the trial
below the defendant brought upon
the stand Mr. Martin Bernard who
was the principal of this agent at the
time the contract in question was en-
tered into. The witness testified that
he gave his agent express authority
to execute any and all contracts that
would tend to increase the business
of the company. When asked if
contracts as the one in question were
directly contemplated byr this express
authority, he answered in unequivo-
cal language that it was. He testi-
fied that this agent and other agents
of the company had on former occa-
sions executed similar contracts and
that such contracts were the usage
and custom of the company. From
such evidence the jury below found
that the agent was acting under ex-
press authority and the counsel for
the appellant is begging the question
when he assumes that there was any
question of implied or apparent
scope of authority involved.
Since it has been shown that the
agent was acting under his express
powers there is no need to discuss
the appellant's second theory, name-
ly that the defendant was bound to
ascertain the scope of the agent's au-
thority. The agency and authority
actually existed and whether or not
the defendant inquired into the na-
ture or extent of this authority can
in no way effect the liability of the
principal.
The second rule of law that the ap-
pellee will advance in support of his
contention that the court below was
correct in its findings is th edoctrine
of ratification. In this argument we
will endeavor -to show that regardless
of whether the agent's acts were au-
thorized, the principal is bound upon
the theory of ratification. The rec-
ord will disclose that the principal in
this case w~s informed of the con-
tract that his agent had executed in
his behalf. That he took no steps to
repudiate the contract and remained
silent as to it. That he even express-
ed his approval of it and said that he
considered himself bound by it.
In the case of the Union Gold Min-
ing Company of Colorado vs. The
Rocky Mountain National Bank of
Central City, Colorado, the facts in
brief were these:
An agent of the mining company
did in excess of his authority borrow
money in the name of the company.
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
He later informed the company of
this act. The company did not re-
pudiate the act of the agent and re-
mained silent on the matter.
The court held that such failure
on the part of the company to repud-
iate the agent's act on learning of it
from the agent and its continued si-
lence constituted a ratification of
such unauthorized act. In rendering
its decision the learned court said:
"If a company is informed of the
borrowing of morney by its agent in
its name and within a reasonable
time fails to disavow such acts of the
agent,,the jury are authorized to con-
sider the company as assenting to
what was done in its name."
In a similar ease of Whitley vs.
James, 49 S. E. 600, the facts were
these:
An agent of a company did in ex-
cess of his authority as agent, extend
credit to certain customers of the
company. Upon learning of this the
company failed to repudiate and re-
mained silent.
The learned court of Georgia in
rendering its dceision in this case and
holding that the principal was bound
said:
"Ratification will result by opera-
tion of law from the principal's tacit
acquiescence in such acts for an un-
reasonable length of time after no-
tice of agent's conduct. That if after
knowledge of what the agent had
done the principal made no objection
for an unreasonable legth of time rat-
ification would result by operation of
law."
The rule laid down in the decisions
of the above briefed cases was up-
held in all of the following cases:
McGeoch vs. Hooker 11 Ill. App.
649.
Argus vs. Ware, 136 N. W. 774.
Halloway vs. Arkansas City Mill,
93 Pac. 577.
Hartwell vs. Equitable Mfg. Co.,
97 Pac. 432.
Raymond vs. Palmer, 17 A. S. R.
398.
Russell vs. Waterloo Threshing
Machine Co., 116 N. W. 611.
In all of the above cited cases the
silence and failure of the principal
to repudiate the unauthorized acts of
his agent were construed as a ratifi-
cation by the -principal of such acts.
The facts as they existed in the case
at issue here are directly in point
with those just cited. The point of
law decided by them is identical with
the one involved here, namely wheth-
er silence and failure to repudiate on
the part of the principal with knowl-
edge of the unauthorized acts of his
agent will constitute a ratification
of these acts.
The principal himself when put
upon the stand in the trial o fthe case
below testified that two days after
the execution of the contract in ques-
tion the agent told him of such con-
tract and explained to him the terms
thereof in full detail. He even tes-
tified that on that occasion he ex-
pressed his intention to recognize the
contract as binding upon the com-
pany of which he was president at
the time. It is quite clear then that
the principal had full gnowledge of
the execution of the contract by his
agent and that he was not uninform-
ed of the provisions and details there-
of. It also appears from the record
that the defendant wrote to the com-
pany and demanded that the com-
pany carry out its part of the con-
tract.
The-record also discloses that the
principal never did in any manner
whatever repudiate the act of his
agent, that he said nothing and did
nothing to signify any intention to
disavow the execution of the con-
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tract. From such action o rrather
failure to act it must necessarily pre-
sumed that he either intended that
the agent should make such a con-
tract or approved of the agent's act.
The decisions and authorities seem
to be in almost perfect accord that
such silence and failure to disavow
on the part of the principal when
possessing full knowledge of the
facts constitute a ratification in
pais.
"Where an agency actually exists,
the mere acquiescence of the princi-
pal may well give rise to the conqlu-
sive presumption of an intentional
ratification of the act."
"Long acquiescence without objec-
tion and even silence of principal
amount to conclusive presumption of
the ratification of an unauthorized
act."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the appellee believes
that the decision of the lower court
was correct on two theories; First
that the execution of the contract in
question was within the express
powers of the agent and that there
was no question of implied or appar-
ent scope of authority involved in
this case; and secondly that whether
the agent acted under authority or
not, the principal's failure t orepud-
iate the act and his continued ac-
quiescence in the act of his agent
constitute a ratification of the act
and the principal is bound.
Wherefore the appellee prays that
the decision of the lower court be, in
all things, affirmed.
All of which is respectfully sub-
mitted to the Honorable, the Supreme
Court of Notre Dame.
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NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT COURT
Record
Be It Remembered, That, to-wit:
on Friday, September 22, 1920, the
Notre Dame Circuit Court was duly
organized with Hon. Francis J. Vur-
pillat as regular Judge presiding,
and the other officers of said court
duly qualified and acting, to-wit:
Henry W. Fritz, Clerk of the Court
and Lawrence Morgan, Sheriff of No-
tre Dame.
Court was opened in due form and
the following proceedings were had
and orders made, towit:
In re Jury Commissioners for the
year 1920-1921: The court appoints
Frank J. Coughlin and George C.
Wittried, two competent persons, cit-
izens and residents of Notre Dame,
Indiana, to act as Jury Commission-
ers of said court for the year 1920-
1921, who now come into open court,
accept said trust and are sworn and
qualified for the discharge of the du-
ties of such Jury Commissioners.
The following rules of court were
promulgated and ordered to be
spread of record: (Here insert)
In re Court Stenographers Court
now appoints William S. Allen to be
official court stenographer of the
court for 1920-1921. Comes said
Allen, accepts said trust and is sworn
to discharge the duties of court sten-
ographer.
CAUSE NO. 1.
Joseph Flick
VS.
George Wittried
Frank J. Coughlin and
Alden J. Cusick,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Gerald Craugh and
James L. O'Toole,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action on account for $500. Com-
plaint and affidavit of merit filed.
Defedant files answer in two para-
graphs and affidavit of merit.
Plaintiff files motion to require de-
fendant to make second paragraph
more specific, which is sustained, and
defendant files amended second para-
graph of answer, alleging accord and
satisfaction.
Plaintiff files reply in general de-
nial to second paragraph of answer.
Cause submitted to court, a jury
being- waived. Trial had, arguments
heard.
Court finds for plaintiff and ren-
ders judgment for $500.
CAUSE NO. 2.
Clyde Walsh
VS.
Charles M. Dunn
Charles P. Mooney and
Joseph D. Sanford,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Archibold M. Duncan and
George Wittried,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action in Special Assumpsit. De-
claration in one count on a promis-
sory note, demand, $200. Affidavit
of merit filed.
Defendant files general demurrer
to the declaration which is overruled,
to which ruling defendant excepts.
Defendant files general issue plea
of non assumpsit and affidavit of
merit. Plea accepted.
Cause submitted to court for trial
without a jury. Arguments are
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heard and the court announces find-
ing for plaintiff in the sum of $200
and costs. Judgment accordingly.
CAUSE NO. 3.
James L. O'Toole
VS.
Joseph Sanford, as Administrator,
Charles M. Dunn and
Edmund Meagher,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Peter Lish and
Norman Barry,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action on a claim against the es-
tate of John Doe, deceased.
Complaint in one paragraph
against Joseph Sanford, as adminis-
trator of the estate of John Doe, de-
ceased.
Defendant filed demurrer to com-
plaint, which plaintiff confesses.
Plaintiff files amended complaint.
Defendant files answer in three
paragraphs, general denial, failure
of consideration and failure to com-
ply with decedent's estates act.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
the third paragraph of answer which
court overrules, to which ruling
plaintiff excepts.
Plaintiff files reply in three para-
graphs.
Defendant moves to strike ou the
second and third paragraphs of re-
ply severally. Court sustains motion
on ground that paragraphs are argu-
mentative general denials. Plaintiff
severally excepts.
Cause at issue is submitted to
court for trial, jury waived.
Arguments are heard and court
finds for plaintiff for $300 as against
the administrator of the estate of
John Doe, deceased, Joseph Sanford,
that said sum is due from said estate
and should be paid by said adminis-
trator. Judgment accordingly.
CAUSE NO. 4
Henry Blake
vs.
James Washburn
William S. Allen and
Joseph Sanford
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
George D. O'Brien and
Clyde Walsh,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Action in replevin for the recovery
of a steer. Declaration and affidavit
in replevin flied.
Defendant files plea in two counts,
non cepit and non detinet.
Plaintiff files similiter.
Cause submitted to the court with-
out a jury. Trial begun.
Plaintiff closes case in chief.
Defendant moves for nonsuit,
which the court overrules, to which
ruling defendant excepts.
Trial is concluded and the argu-
ments are heard.
Court finds that the plaintiff is the
owner of and entitled to the imme-
diate possession of the steer describ-
ed in the declaration and that plain-
tiff have writ of replevin for such
property and $10 damages for its de-
tention. Judgment on the finding.
CAUSE NO. 5
Charles Dressler
VS.
Nellie Cranford and Walter Cranford
This case pending on the trial cal-
endar for trial before a jury.
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JUNIOR MOOT COURT
The following cases were argued
orally by the respective attorneys
named on the hypothetical facts stat-
ed. Only the cases citey by the re-
spective parties appear here. These
cases will later be developed and
submitted for trial in the Notre
Dame Circuit Court by the lawyers
who argued them in this court. The
statements of fact and citations fol-
low:
CAUSE NO. 1.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Reilly
VS.
Gerald Davenport
Plaintiff parked his limousine in
Michigan Street, South Bend, Indi-
ana, at right angles with the curbing,
in violaton of a city ordinance. The
defendant, while carelessly and neg-
ligently driving his automobile,
crashed into the limousine and dam-
aged it to the extent of $1,000, for
which plaintiff brings action.
Vincent B. Pater and
Aaron H. Huguenard,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff should recover, notwith-
standing his violation of the city or-
dinance, for this violation was only
a condition and did not contribute
proximately to the infliction of the
damage. Berry vs. Borough, Pa. 43
Atl. 240; Scheuerer vs. Banner Rub-
ber Co., 38 L. R. A. 1207; Steel vs.
Burkhart, 6 Am. Rep. 191; Spoffard
vs. Harlow, 3 Mass. 176; Railroad
Co. vs. Buck, 115 Ind. 566; Tackett
vs. Taylor, Ia. 98 N. W. 730; Clopper
vs. Coffey, 44 Md. 117; Railroad Co.
vs. Price, Ga. 32 S. E. 77; Rider Case,
N. Y. 63 N. E.
Franklin E. Miller and
John J. Buckley,
Attorneys for Defendant.
The parking of plaintiff's car in
violation of the city ordinance in the
crowded, busy Michigan Street, was
in itself such a negligent act as con-
tributed proximately to the injury
and therefore should bar recovery.
Norris vs. Litchfield, N. H. 69 Am.
Dec. 546; Meyers vs. Meinrath, 101
Mass. 36 -3 Am. Rep. 368; Cranson
vs. Goss, 107 Mass. 309-9 Am. Rep.
45; Cratty vs. City of Bangor, 2 Am.
Rep. 56; Lloyd vs. Pugh, Wis. 149
N. W. 150; Ludke vs. Burek, Wis.
152 N. W. 190; Savett vs. M. & L.
Ry. Co., 77 Am. Dec. 422; Day vs.
Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 137 Ind. 206;
Brazil Block Coal Co. vs. Heedler,
129 Ind. 327.
CAUSE NO. 2.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Whitcomb
VS.
Marshall Carper
Plaintiff brings action to recover
$200 paid to defendant as purchase
price for a horse, harness and bug-
gy.
Plaintiff was a minor at time of
purchase, a married man with wife
and child, worked as a day laborer
for support of himself and family,
and did not use the purchased pro-
perty except for pleasure riding.
Plaintiff, at time of bringing action,
had sold the harness and buggy, and
the horse had been condemned by the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals as unfit for use. Not-
withstanding plaintiff offered no re-
turn of the property he seeks recov-
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
ery of the money paid by him as
stated.
Arthur Keeney and
Harry E. Denny,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
This is an infant's voidable con-
tract, is not for necessaries, and
plaintiff may recover without return-
ing the consideration. Nor does the
marriage of the infant change his
status as infant. Antonio vs. Miller,
34 Pac. 40; Goodman vs. Alexander,
55 L. R. A. 781; Guthrie vs. Murphy,
28 Am. Dec. 681; Price vs. Sanders,
60 Ind. 30; Beichler vs. Guenther, 96
N. W. 895; The Rose Case, 27 Am.
Rep. -; Ryan vs. Smith, 165 Mass.
303-43 N. E. 109; House vs. Alexan-
der, 105 Ind. 109; Wheat6n vs. East,
26 Am. Dec. 251; Forda vs. Van
Horn 30 Am. Dec. 77; N. & C. Ry.
Co., 78 Am. Dec. 506; Green vs.
Green, 69 N. Y. 553; Miles vs. Lin-
german, 24 Ind. 385; The Lemon
Case (Ohio) 15 N. E. 476; Wallace
vs. Leroy, 50 S. E. 243-110 Am. St.
Rep. 777; Larkin vs. Foster, 64 Atl.
1048.
John F. Heffernan and
T. Spencer McCabe,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff, by marriage, assumes the
contract obligations of an adult, with
respect to his family, and for his pur-
chase in this case made for the bene-
fit of his family he is liable. At any
rate he cannot disaffirm the contract
without return of the consideration.
Glenn vs. Hollopeter, Ca. 21 L. R.
A. 847; Cochrane vs. Cochrane, 196
N. Y. 86; Commonwealth vs. Gra-
ham, 16 L. R. A. 578; Aldrich vs.
Bennett, 56 Am. Rep. 529; Houch vs.
LaJunta Hdwr. Co., Col. 114 Pac.
645; Coburn vs. Raymond 100 Am.
St. Rep. 1000; Taft vs. Pike, 14 Vt.
306; Words & Phrases, vol. 8, pg.
680; Englebert vs. Pritchett, 26 L.
R. A. 177; Johnson vs. N. W. Mut. L.
Co., 26 L. R. A. 187.
CAUSE NO. 3.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John D. Carson as Admr. of the Es-
tate of Ray Stephens, deceased
VS.
Charles D. Simpson and Edward
Williams
Ray Stephens, in his lifetime, made
an agreement with Charles D. Simp-
son to sell him a horse on approval.
The understanding was that Simp-
son should take the horse and try
him, and if the horse suited him,
give Stephens his note with approved
security; but if the horse did not
suit him he was to return the horse
to Stephens.
A few days after this agreement
Stephens was killed. Simpson did
not return the horse, but later traded
it to the other defendant, Edward
Williams.
Plaintiff brings action to recover
the horse or its value.
Patrick E. Granfield and
Joseph J. Doran,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
To support plaintiff's right of ac-
tion the following cases are cited:
Wolf Co. vs. Monarch Refrigerator
Co., 96 N. E. 1063; Fox vs. Wilken-
son, Wis. 113 N. W. 669-14 L. R. A.
(NS.) 1107; 2 Benj. on Sales 4th
ed. 1051; Cream Cirt Glass Co. vs.
Friedlander, 84 Wis. 53-21 L. R. A.
(NS.) 135; Dodsworth vs. Hercules
Iron Wks., 66 Fed. 483; Brown vs.
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Foster, N. Y. 15 N. E. 608; Vanwin-
kle vs. Crowell, 146 U. S. 42.
William A. Miner and
Clarence Smith,
Attorneys for Defendant.
The trading of the horse by Simp-
son to Williams constituted an ap-
proval of the horse for purchase and
a valid acceptance of the offer to sell,
so as to pass title 'to the defendants.
Plaintiff cannot therefore recover
property that belongs to defendants.
Mactier's Adm. vs. Frith, 21 Am.
Dec. 262; Bower vs. Detroit Ry. Co.,
20 N. W. 559; Sweeney vs. Vaaghor,
29 S. W. 903; Yale vs. Coddington, 21
Wend. 173; Bradbury vs. Marburry,
46 Am. Dec. 264; Girard vs. Taggert,
9 Am. Dec. 327; Grant vs. Groshaon,
3 Am. Dec. 725; Brackenridge vs.
State, 11 S. W. 630; Stephenson vs.
Repp, 25 N. E. 803; Foster vs. Ad-
ams, 15 Atl. 169.
CAUSE NO. 4.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Mansfield
VS.
Daniel O'Conner
James Mansfield, in company with
three others, went upon the farm -of
Daniel O'Conner, to hunt. This was
without the permission and knowl-
edge of O'Conner. O'Conner had
signs tacked upon his fences on
which was printed: "No hunting al-
lowed on these premises.
O'Conne rowned and kept a big
shepherd dog. This dog had the
known habit of running to the fence
and barking viciously at passers-by.
On one occasion the dog had gone
through the open gate and bitten a
man, of which fact, O'Conner had
been informed.
Mansfield, on the occasion in ques-
tion, had no knowledge whatever of
the fact that O'Conner had a dog,
until the dog viciously attacked him
and seriously wounded him, biting
him three times in the legs. O'Con-
ner was not at home at the time of
the hunting trip of Mansfield and
knew nothing whatever about the af-
fair until he arrived home later. The
dog attacked and bit Mansfield while
he wos on the premises of O'Conner.
Is O'Conner liable to Mansfield or
has he a defense to the action which
Mansfield brings for the injuries sus-
tained on account of the dog bites?
Edwin J. McCarthy and
Mark R. Healey,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Defendant is liable for the injuries
inflicted by his dog which he knew
was of a vicious character, even
though the plaintiff may have been
a trespasser. Partlow vs. Hagerty,
35 Ind. 178; Williams Case, 74 Ind.
25; Clanin vs. Fagan, 124 Ind. 304;
Sherfey vs. Bartley, 67 Am. Dec.
597; Woolfe vs. Chalker, 31 Conn.
121-81 Am. Dec. 175; Rider vs.
White, 65 N. Y. 54-22 Am. Rep. 600;
Grasson vs. Hofius, 80 Pac. 1002;
Marsh vs. Jones, 52 Am. Dec. 67;
Glidden vs. Moore, 45 Am. Rep. 98.
Joseph H. Farley and
William E. Krippene,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff was a trespasser on de-
fendant's premises and defendant
owed him no duty except not to do
him wilfull injury. Defendant's dog
was kept on his own premises and
was not of such character as would
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make defendant liable to trespassers.
Indiana Refining Co. vs. Nobley, 24
L. R. A. (NS.) 497; Victor Coal Co.
vs. Muir, 26 L. R. A. 435; St. Louis
R. R. Co. vs. Holsman, 57 S. W. 770;
Benson vs Baltimore Traction Co.,
20 L. R. A. &14; Muench vs. Hein-
nan, 96 N. W. 800; Ritz vs. City, etc.,
31 S. W. 993; Galveston Oil Co. vs.
Morton, 7 S. W. 756; Indpls. vs. Em-
melman, 108 Ind. 530; Ind. B. & W.
Ry. vs. Barnhart, 115 Ind. 399.
CAUSE NO. 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sadie Thompson
VS.
Carl Meyne
Carl Meyne and his wife were mid-
dle-aged people having no children
of their own. They lived on a farm
in a comfortable country home. Sa-
die Thompson was a girl of fourteen
years, of the general size and health
of girls of that age. Sadie went into
the home of the Meynes and lived
there three years. During the first
two years, Sadie went to the country
school during school terms of the
year. At all other times, including
morning and evenings she did the
chores and work about a country
home where there are horses, cows,
chickens, etc., on the farm. Sadie
did all kinds of house work, milking,
churning, feeding, cleaning, etc. She
worked about the kitchen and the
rooms of the home. In fact, Sadie
did everything she was directed to
do.
The Meynes boarded and lodged
Sadie and gave her some clothing,
which, however, she claims was one
pair of stockings, a calico dress and
a pair of shoes, but what the Meynes
claimed was all Sadie needed in ad-
dition to what she had when she
came to their home.
After three years, Sadie left the
Meynes. At no time did Sadie ever
ask for money and at no time did the
Meynes ever give her any money. At
no time did Sadie ask for wages or
pay for her services and at no time
did the Meynes ever ask Sadie to
pay them anything for her board and
lodging. And when Sadie left the
Meyne home, there was nothing said
by either as to any charge or account
between them.
Three months after leaving the
Meyne home Sadie brings action for
wages at the rate of two dollars per
week for the entire time of her stay
at the Meynes.
Paul V. Paden and
Frank M. Hughes,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
There is an implied contract to pay
plaintiff what her services are reas-
onably worth. Hodge vs. Hodge,
Admr. (Wash.) 91 Pac. 764-11 L. R.
A. 873, and Note on page 888; Hef-
ron vs. Brown, 155 Ill. 322-40 N. E.
583; Caven vs. Musgrave, 73 Iowa
384.
Paul J. Schwertley and
Raymond J. Kearns,
Attorneys for Defendant.
One living in the household as a
member of the family is not entitled
to pay for services rendered, nor is
there any liability for board and
lodging. Grohan vs. Stanton, 58 N.
E. 1023; Walker vs. Taylor, 64 Pac.
193; Windland vs. Deeds, 44 Iowa
98 ;Smith vs. Johnson, 45 Iowa 308;
Jackson vs. Jackson, 31 S. E. 78;
Hall vs. Finch, 29 Wis. 278; Andrews
vs. Foster, 17 Vt. 556; Butler vs.
Store, 50 Pa. St. 451; Oxford vs. Mc-
Farland, 3 Ind. 156.
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TRIAL BRIEFS IN CASE
John Reilly vs. Gerald Davenport
Cause No. 1
Junior Moot Court
By
Aaron H. Huguenard for Plaintiff
Franklyn E. Miller for Defendant
OF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff parked his limousine in Michigan Street, South Bend, Indi-
ana, at right angles with the curbing in violation of the city ordinance.
The defendant, while carelessly and negligently driving his automobile,
crashed into the limousine and damaged it to the extent of $1,000, for
which plaintiff brings action.
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIF
Defendant is liable to plaintiff for
a tort. Certainly the plaintiff had the
right not to be damaged in his prop-
erty; and certainly there was impos-
ed on the defendant a duty not to
cause the destruction of his limou-
sine, as he did.
Defendant is liable for the specific
tort of negligence. Negligence, ac-
cording to many reliable authorities
such as Cooley and Chapin, consists
in failing to fulfill a legal duty to ex-
ercise a proper degree of care, where-
by damage results to one to whom
such legal duty is owing. Defendant
"carelessly and negligently" ran into
the plaintiff's limousine.
Has the plaintiff a right to dam-
ages? One of the facts given above
is that the plaintiff's machine was
parked in violation of a city ordin-
ance; that the angle which it formed
with the curb was greater than that
which the city ordinance permits.
Now, it is a well-known rule of law
that no one will be permitted to pro-
fit by his own wrong. It would be
unreasonable to think that one would
be allowed to commit an illegal act
and then as a result of it, enter into
litigation and receive a handsome
verdict, and we of the plaintiff's side
realize this very well. We are ready
to admit that if a person's unlawful
act contributes proximately to his
own injury, he may not recover dam-
ages of another for a negligent par-
ticipation in that injury, but the
mere fact that he is engaged in an
unlawful act is not enough to bar his
action unless the transgression of the
law has contributed directly to the
accident.
Consequently, if the illegal con-
duct of the injured party proximate-
ly causes his injury-remember,
proximately causes-he will be with-
out redress. It must be always kept
in mind that the illegal conduct must
be a proximate or concurring cause,
for if the plaintiff's conduct merely
renders the injury possible it will be
merely treated as a condition. Con-
cerning the defense of contributory
negligence, in the case of Rider vs.
Syracuse Rapid Tr. Co., 171 N. .Y.
139-63 N. E. 836-58 L. R. A. 125, it
is sail: "Plaintiff's negligence must
be proximate cause in the same sense
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in which the defendant's negligence
must have been a proximate cause in
order to give a right of action." In
other words, if the plaintiff's act was
merely a remote cause or condition,
there can be no bar to his recovery.
Perhaps, it would be well for me to
go into detail more concerning the
words, "cause" and "condition ;" or,
as sometimes differentiated "proxi-
mate cause" and "remote cause."
We find in the law dictionaries,
condition defined as "a mechanical
antecedent without casual power,"
cause, defined as "the responsible
ble, voluntary agent, changing the
ordinary course of nature." A prox-
imate cause must be a "causa caus-
ans; not merely a causa sine qua
von." All courts are agreed that
there is an essential difference be-
tween a cause and a condition but
the difficulty arises in trying to dis-
tinguish between them.
In the Railroad Company vs. Price,
a Georgia case, 32 S. E. 77, the de-
fendant negligently carried the
plaintiff past her destination and the
conductor advised her to spend the
night at a certain hotel in the town
at which she alighted, agreeing to
pay her expenses and to carry her
back in the morning. It was held
that his negligence in carrying her
past her station is not to be regarded
as a cause of injuries received by her
from the explosion of a lamp at the
hotel.
Again, where a town negligently
permits a tree to remain standing in
a street notwithsanding its danger-
ous condition, which tree is blown
down and strikes a motorman who
is running his car at an illegal rate
of speed, the illegal speed is a condi-
tion merely. Berry vs. Borough,
Penn., 43 Atl. .240.
I cite these cases to show what the
courts have held as conditions or re-
mote causes. In our case, everything
hinges upon these two words, condi-
tion and cause.
Was the fact that our client's car
was illegally parked, a concurring
cause of the collision or was it a mere
condition? That is the issue. Upon
the answer to this question depends
the decision. If the car so parked
was a concurring cause of the acci-
dent, then the plaintiff is without re-
dress. If the car so parked was
merely a condition, then the judg-
ment must go to the plaintiff.
No reasonable person would hold
that the mere parking of the car was
a concurring cause of the accident.
For the, doctrine of contributory
negligence to apply, the plaintiff's
negligence must be concurrent of the
same kind, immediate, and not some-
thing of a prior time. In this case,
the plaintiff had already violated the
ordinance,his act was of a past time,
and it was not of the same nature as
the defendant's
In Scheurer vs. Banner Rubber
Co., 227 Mo. 347-126 S. W. 1037-28
L. R. A. (NS) 1207, the court says:
"If the plaintiff's negligence affords
only an opportunity or occasion for
the injury, or a mere condition of it,
it is no bar to his action." And all
we contend is that our case be decid-
ed in accordance with this principle.
True it is that the plaintiff's ma-
chine would not have been damaged,
had it not been located where it was,
but it does not follow that it would
have gone unharmed, had it been
parked in accordance with the city
ordinance, for the conduct of the de-
fendant was of such a grossly care-
less and negligent nature that it more
than likely would have been ruined
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even had it been a little closer to the
curb.
The plaintiff's car is of a limousine
type. Suppose it had been an ambu-
lance backed at a right angle to the
curb, waiting to receiving one on
stretchers. The defendant's car, in
its riotous meanderings, would have
crashed into the ambulance far more
easily than it would into the plain-
tiff's car, for the latter car was not
parked at so blunt an angle. Could
the defendant have pleaded contribu-
tory negligence or illegal conduct of
the plaintiff in the ambulance case?
Or, suppose it had been a truck back-
ed at a right angle unloading articles
of great weight. Both the ambulance
and the truck would have protruded
farther into the street than the lim-
ousine without constituting an ille-
gal act or an act of contributory neg-
ligence. Plaintiff's action in parking
his limousine cannot reasonably be
considered a concurring cause while
in the hypothetical ambulance and
truck cases the positions of those ma-
chines do not constitute even so much
as a remote cause. If the plaintiff's
act in this case is not a concurring
cause, then it must be a condition,
and as such, decision must go to the
plaintiff. Let us cite a few cases in
point.
In Steele vs. Burkhardt, 104 Mass.
59- 6 Am. Rep. 191, this occurred:
Plaintiff had his wagon parked at an
angle which was prohibited by city
ordinance. The defendant carelessly
drove upon the plaintiff's horse and
injured him. The case is exactly an-
alogous to the present case and the
judgment was for the plaintiff. The
court said: "The plaintiff did show
negligence in respect to keeping the
ordinance, but did not necessarily
show negligence that contributed to
the injury." And we are willing to
admit the same here, namely: that
the plaintiff did show negligence as
to the ordinance but that he did not
directly contribute to the injury.
In Spofford vs. Harlow, 3 Mass.,
176, it was held that though the
plaintiff's sleigh was on the wrong
side of the street in violation of law,
the defendant was liable, if his ser-
vant ran into the plaintiff carelessly
and recklessly, the plaintiffs negli-
gence not contributing to the injury.
In the Railroad Company vs. Buck,
116 Ind. 566-19 N. E. 453, a laborer
while working on Sunday was injur-
ed through defendant's negligence.
The defendant plead the fact that
plaintiff was violating the Sunday
working law. The court said: "Our
conclusion is that a person injured
through the negligent omission of
another, even though he violated the
observance of the Sunday law, will
not be denied a recovery."
This case while not so similar in
facts as the two Massachusetts cases
cited is exactly in point in that viola-
tion of a statute by the plaintiff will
not preclude a recovery where defen-
dant has been negligent, if the plain-
tiff has not been a proximate cause
of the injury.
In Tackett vs. Taylor, 123 Iowa
149-98 N. W. 730, an Iowa case, it
was held that conducting a machine
across a defective bridge in an unlaw-
ful manner does not bar recovery un-
less it contributes directly to the in-.
jury.
And so we might go on citing num-
erous cases, all bringing out this
point: Plaintiff can maintain an ac-
tion for damages caused by defend-
ant's negligence, even though plain-
tiff does violate an ordinance, provid-
ed that he does not contribute direct-
ly to the injury. But that these will
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suffice to bring out the general prin-
ciple.
That the plaintiff violated an ordi-
nance is admitted, but we vigorously
contend that violation is only an oc-
casion for the injury, or a condition
of it, and therefore, decision should
be in plaintiff's favor.
BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT
There is no distinction between the
violation of a state statute and the
infraction of a municipal ordinance;
both are, by the law, placed upon the
same plane: Hayes vs. Michigan Cen-
tral R. R. Co., 111 U. S.; Yanke vs.
Lange et al., Wis., 170 N. W. 722; 21
Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law 483; 33
Minnesota 323.
The judge should peremptorily in-
struct the jury that the act of the
plaintiff in parking his car in violation
of the city ordinance constituted neg-
ligence per se: Lloyd vs. Pugh, Wis.
149 N. W. 150; Ludke vs Burke, Wis.
152, N. W. 190; Smith vs. M. B. & T.
E., 91 Wisconsin 360-64 N. W. 1041-
30 L. R. A. 504-51 Am. St. Rep. 912.
The law is uniform to the effect
that a person, being engaged in vio-
lation of law, cannot recover if his
own illegal act was an essential ele-
ment of his case as disclosed upon
all of the evidence: Norris vs. Litch-
field, 35 New Hampshire, 271-69 Am.
Dec. 546; Meyers vs. Meinrath, 101
Mass. 366-3 Am. Rep. 368; Cranston
vs Goss, 107 Mass. 309-9 Am. Rep.
45; 119 Mass. 66-Rep. 315; Smith vs.
Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 120
Mass. 490-21 Am. Rep. 530; New-
cbmb vs. Boston Pro. Ass'n., 146
Mass. 596-4 Amn. St. Rep. 354;
Cratty vs. City of Bangor, 57 Me.
423-2 Amn. Rep. 56; Johnson vs.
Town of Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28-19 Am.
Rep. 111.
The rule of law as applied to an ac-
tion of tort for injuries inflicted upon
the plaintiff while he is engaged in
an unlawful act is that if his illegal
act did not contribute to the injury,
but was independent of it, he is not
precluded thereby from recovering.
And this, we submit, is the true rule
of the law. Schultz vs. Paul, Ind. Law
Report 10; Spofford vs. Harlow, 3
Allen 176; Kearns vs. Sowden, 104
Mass. 63; Steele vs. Burkhardt, 104
Mass. 59-6 Am. Rep. 191. However,
if the jury find that the conduct of
the plaintiff either proximately or
contributorily affected the injury of
which he now complains, he will not
be entitled to recover: Lloyd vs. Pugh
and Ludke vs. Burck, supra. In oth-
er words, whether or not the act of
the plaintiff either proximately or
contributorily affected the collision
is a question of fart for the jury:
Milw. and St. P. R. R. Company vs.
Timothy Kellogg, Iowa. 94 U. S. 469-
24 Law. Ed. 256; Chapin on Torts
103; White vs. Long, 128 Mass. 598-
35 Am. Rep. 402.
In order for the plaintiff to recov-
er he must show that he exercised
due care in the prevention of the in-
jury of which he now complains. Sa-
vet vs. Manchester and Lawrence R.
R. Co. 77 Am. Dec. 422; Heland vs.
City of Lowell, Mass. 81 Am. Dec.
670; Damon vs. Inhab. of Scituate,
119 Mass. 66-20 Am. Rep. 315; Smith
vs. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 21 Am.
Rep. 538; Norris vs. Litchfield, 35 N.
H. 271-69 Am. Dec. 546; Newcomb
ye. Boston Pro. Ass'n. 146 Mass. 596-
4 Am. St. Rep. 354.
In the leading case of Savett vs. R.
R. Co., supra. the court held, that a
passenger in a railway car is wanting
in ordinary care, if, knowing that the
train is moving, he goes out on the
platform of a car, and steps there-
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from upon the platform of the sta-
tion while the car is still in motion,
and he cannot recover from the rail-
road company for an injury resulting
therefrom.
If a person needlessly and reck-
lessly exposes himself to open and ob-
vious danger by his failure to exer-
cise due care, and thereby suffers an
injury as the result thereof, he will
be guilty of such negligence as will
prevent a recovery for such injury;
Day vs. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co.,
137 Ind. 206-36 N. E. -854; Brazil
Block Coal Co. vs. Hoodler 129 Ind.,
327-27 N. E. 741. In the first of
these cases the court held, that where
a railroad employee, a car repairer,
in helping to move a car upon the
track, took a position at the draw
bar, under a running board, one end
of which rested on the car that was
being moved and the other end on an-
other car, one of which, when the car
sad been moved far enough fell on the
employee, injuring him, the employee
being ignorant of the fact that such
board had not been removed, but
which he could easily have seen if he
had looked, the danger being as ob-
vious to the employee as to the em-
ployer-the employee cannot recov-
er; and in such case, it is the duty of
the trial court to instruct the jury
to find for the defendant, the em-
ployer.
A fortiori, if a person exposes his
property to open and obvious danger
through his failure to exercise due
care, as did the plaintiff do in this
case, in that he permitted his limou-
sine to be parked in violation of a
municipal ordinance, to protrude out
and obstruct the public highway for
a period of time exceeding three
hours, a highway whereon a heavy
traffic was in the course of operation,
it follows that he cannot now com-
plain of the injury inflicted upon his
property, which injury-in part at
least- was attributable to his failure
to exercise due care. The law, I take
it, requires that men shall use the
senses with which nature has endow-
ed them, and when, without excuse,
they fail to do so, they alone must
suffer the consequences, and they are
not excused when they fail to discov-
er the danger if they made no attempt
to employ the faculties with which
nature has blessed them.
Especially is this true when the
law imposes an obligation or duty on
an individual and charges him with
the duty to exercise due care. Brazil
Block Coal Co. vs. Hoodler, supra;
Stewart, Admr. vs. Pa. Ry. Co. 130
Ind. 242-29 N.E. 916; Pa. Ry. Co. vs.
Meyers 136 Ind. 242-36 N. E. 32.
Therefore when the plaintiff in
this case failed to exercise even slight
care in the protection of his proper-
ty, when he neglected to call into op-
eration his reasoning power to work
upon the material supplied him by
experience, namely, that it was dan-
gerous and an unnecessary risk for
a man to allow his property to pro-
ject into a congested highway, when
he absolutely ignored and broke the
provisions of the municipal ordin-
ance, he did then and there assume
all responsibility for any damages
which might be inflicted upon his
property through the negligence of
some other person.
Franklin Elliot Miller,
Attorney for the Defendant.
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(Contributing Section)
THE LAW AND LAWYERS
By William Hloynes, A. M., LL.D.,
Dean Emeritus
It is commonly said that the legal
profession is over crowded. This is
a pessimistic generalization.. It is
lacking in valid basis. It may be ad-
mitted, however, that there is no
special dearth of lawyers anywhere,
whether in our cities or average
towns. There is probably no county
seat in any of our states that has not
its due quota of them. Statistics in-
dicate that there is one for every 660
persons throughout the country.
Early in the last century they were
proportionately less than half as
numerous. In other countries they
compare numerically with the thous-
ands or more as they do here with
the hundreds. Their number has in-
creased responsively to the growth
and expansion of business, although
doubling relatively to the augment-
ing aggregate of population.
The late war caused a diminution
in the trend of young men to the pro-
fession and materially abated the al-
leged prospect of overcrowding it.
Moreover, of late years the normal
volume of legal business has meas-
urably decreased. This remark is
confined to such business as could
customarily be counted upon or ex-
pected by the ordinary lawyer-the
lawyer in general practice. Many
disputed accounts of merchants and
traders are now referred to and set-
tled by arbitration. Where this is
not done they are usually intrusted
to collecting agencies, which have
their own lawyers to represent them
in litigation. Trust companies and
corporations generally in the more
populous centers retain lawyers for
their special service and pay them
annual salaries. To them for ad-
vice or action in court are commit-
ted matters involving possible or
probable litigation. Needless to
state, they are almost invariably dis-
posed of apart from the regular pro-
fession or lawyers engaged independ-
ently in practice. Their fixed policy,
however, seems to be in favor of set-
tlement or compromise and the avoid-
ance of litigation. In this respect
their course is commendable and in
harmony with the precepts of legal
ethics.
But there is another class of law-
yers, or pseudo-lawyers, who are ap-
propriately styled shysters. They
are intrusive and crafty, unscrupu-
lousandbrazen. Theydo not hesitate
to seekandopenlysolicit business. In-
deed, sometimes they go further and
actually harass prospective litigants
in the hope of being retained by
them. If they learn of an accident
involving personal injury they lose
no time in communicating with the
victim or his family, offering their
services and saying that they will pay
all the costs of litagation and take
the case on shares, 40 or 50 per cent.
to themselves and the balance to the
victim or his family. If they hear of
a family quarrel, with prospect of a
suit for legal separation or divorce,
they let it be known promptly by
card or personal interview that their
services are at command. If an as-
sault or murder be committed, and
the perpetrator or his family can
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furnish funds for defense, their bus-
iness cards or personal appeals to be
retained in the case quickly follow.
Not a few of them make the police
court their favorite morning rendez-
vous, in order that they may be at
hand to tender their legal aid to per-
sons arrested during the preceding
night for drunkenness, disorderly
coduct, and the like. If they are told
of some one having a dormant claim
susceptible of being twisted into
ground work for a suit they seek his
acquaintance, express belief in his
having a case and urge him to intrust
them with it. Of course, all such
practices are violative of legal ethics,
discreditable to the shysters and de-
rogatory to the profession. Reputa-
ble lawyers are now striving to elim-
inate these buzzards and prevent
heieafter their admission to the bar.
Trough such practices a spirit of
commercialism has crept into the
.profession in some of the larger cit-
ies, and its traditional dignity, chiv-
alry and honor are thus becoming
obscured and jeopardized. Hence
the solicitude of the American Bar
Association and reputable lawyers
generally to block the danger and
turn to rescue work.
Trust companies and even labor
unions cut materially into the legiti-
mate and regular business of the
general profession. Such companies
now claim and control in notable de-
gree real estate transfers, the settle-
ment of the estates of deceased per-
sons, the guardianship of orphans or
other wards, the collection of money
and management of funds according
to directions of testators and trus-
tees, the transfer of securities and
the investment of funds under trust
terms, and, in short, things innum-
erable that formerly passed in the
main through the hands of lawyers
engaged in general practice. And as
for labor unions the practice seems
to be to turn over to certain lawyers
in apparent affiliation with them such
matters of litigation as concern the
membership as a whole or the mem-
bers individually.
The pessimist may admit that
such facts have weight in disproving
his assumption that the profession is
overcrowded. "But look," says he,
"behold the vast number of students
in the law schools of the country who
are preparing to enter it! It will cer-
tainly be overcrowded when they get
their diplomas and pass the examin-
ation for admission to the bar!"
Another mistake, Mr. Pessimist!
Less than 50 per cent of those who
study law follow it as a profession.
The knowledge they thus acquire is
utilized in other pursuits. It is of
exceptional value in all lines of busi-
ness, not to mention other profes-
sions, and as the foundation of a
broad and practical education. It is
safe to say that no branch of study is
more serviceable and illuminating in
preparing the mind for the acquisi-
tion of sound, useful and available
knowledge. It enters almost uncon-
sciously but controllingly into the
mind, and imparts prudence to
thought and guidance to action. It
teaches the mind to investigate and
examine the problems and difficul-
ties referred to it for practical con-
sideration and to pursue the path of
calm reflection and discerning wis-
dom in reaching their solution. It
guides to sound discretion in busi-
ness affairs, showing with seeming
intuition when a contract has been
validly made, when a wrong has been
done or may be avoided in tort, or
when a lawless act has been perpe-
trated or threatened in the realm of
crime. It opens and presents to the
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observing mind the whole vast do-
main of nature's organic laws and op
erations and man's countless activi-
ties.
Inscrutable in many respects
though it be to our hampered vision,
yet it is the most interesting and in-
viting vista to which the human eye
may turn in the whole plan of mun-
dane life. Knowledge of the fact
seem to be instinctive, and it is reas-
onably obvious that the law offers the
surest and most practicable means of
journeying safely and creditably
through the mazes of human life. Its
helpful guidance is a trusty mentor
that leads not astray. Is it surpris-
ing, therefore, that so many apply
themselves to its study, even without
purpose to engage in its practice,
viewing it as a matchless factor in
sound educational equipment?
Though they finish, let it be re-
peated, the prescribed course of stu-
dy in law schools and receive diplo-
mas evidencing the fact, yet from 50
to 60 per cent of them turn to other
professional walks and the occupa-
tions innumerable they decide to se-
lect. Their knowledge of the law be-
speaks for them high standing and
exceptional success in the fields of
their ultimate choice. Many even of
those admitted to the bar, as in the
case of President Wilson, see surer
ground of success and advancement
in other lines of activity, and act ac-
cordingly, yielding to the impulse of
following the latest alluring call.
The man destined, however, to be-
come a power in the law decides un-
alterably to stick to it. The hard-
ships he must encounter and the dif-
culties he must overcome may seem
unbearable, but he does not become
faint-hearted nor is his courage
abated. His clothes may become
thin and threadbare, but he com-
plains not of cold and seems to ignore
their shabbiness. His larder may
be empty and his food the coarsest
and cheapest procurable, but the
pinch of hnunger does not affect him
and the simplest food is a feast be-
fore the great and dominating pas-
sion he cherishes for his beloved
Themis-the Law. He knows that
it is within the common experience
to wait many months and tedious
years for success, and he is willing,
goodnaturedly to get into line and
wait his turn. Health may fail, but
the spirit does not, in a young man
of this type. He reads, works, ob-
serves and studies to the full rneas-
ure of his strength. He takes to
heart and cultivates the qualities
likely to make him popular, respect-
ed and trustworthy. He knows that
character makes the man and is the
stamp which unquestionably passes
current everywhere, so he seeks to
base his own on the pedestal of
honesty, reliability, truthfulness and
efficiency. He aspires to become
learned, efficient, successful and con-
spicuous in the law, and to this end
thus visualizes in mental picture as
to traits and character his inspiring
exemplar of honorable achievement
and acclaimed greatness in the pro-
fession.
My exemplar in law is fundamen-
tally and invariably a gentleman, al-
though in this respect all the learned
professions are or should be in kin-
ship. He is liberally aducated and
fully aware of the obligations he sus-
tains to his profession, fellow-citi-
zens and society. He is alert and
prompt in the discharge of the du-
ties he assumes, punctual and reliable
in the performance of his profession-
al functions, deliberate in judgment
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and conscientious in conforming to
the trust and confidence reposed in
him. By nature, inclination and civ-
ic study he is fond of his country and
ready to respond to its call in forum,
field or council whenever emergen-
cies arise and dangers seem immi-
nent. As a representative of the
law he aims to be unbiased in his es-
timate of men. In dealing with them
he is modest, kindly, genial and al-
truistic, and thus easily obtains ac-
cess to their confidence and abiding
claim on their good will. If in his
way right be assailed by wrong his
sense of justice impels him instinc-
tively by word and act to side with
the right and repel the wrong with
requisite force and valor. He min-
gles unassumingly with his fellow-
citizens and is ready always to bear
his share of the common burden, as
well as to proclaim and advocate or
defend all reasonable measure look-
ing to the public welfare. In doing
so he serves with alacrity in any .ca-
pacity that the occasion may demand.
The mean passion of envy and the
odious vice of duplicity find no room
in his frank and manly nature. In
the discharge of his varied duties,
civic and social, he aims to be just
and honorable. He makes no prom-
ise that he cannot or does not intend
to fulfill. Honesty is his pole-star,
and he abhors the thought of cheat-
ing, deceiving or misleading any
man. I'e believes that religion is the
soul of the law, complementary to it
at every angle, and he endeavors to
square his thoughts and acts confor-
mably to its teachings. He views the
law as a noble science, not as a mere
art, and conscientiously dedicates to
it his life and best services. He
would make and keep it impartial, ef-
cient and trustworthy-thepalladium
of right, the embodiment of justice
and the preserver of peace-in short,
a blessing indispensable to society
and mankind. He desires his profes-
sion to be as learned in fact as it re-
putedly is in name. He knows that
his acts, whether good or bad, will
be imputed to it in some measure,
and finds in this consciousness an
added stimulus to think, speak and
act the part of a gentleman, whether
in the forum on the hustings or in
the public mart. His professional
work is characterized by forethought
and careful preparation, so that he
may not betray ignorance and suffer
humiliation before the court and
jury, embarrass the judge and con-
sume time not his own in correcting
or amending with judicial leave mis-
takes in his pleadings, trespassing
on the time of other lawyers and the
public by delaying the regular pro-
cedure of the court through his inex-
cusable negligence and blundering,
forfeit the confidence of his dliet and
probably lose his case through negli-
gence and incompetency.
The aspiring and reflecting stu-
dent might have added many oother
traits of character to his ideal pic-
ture of a great and honored lawyer
before his eager vision. At any rate,
so far as they go, they promise ef-
ficiency, popularity, success and dis-
tinction in the profession. The stu-
dent's visualized' exemplar beckons
inspiringly to all learners of the law.
A LETTER
Hoynes College of Law
Univerversity of Notre Dame
Dear Colonel Hoynes:-
The November issue of the Notre
Dame Law Reporter will contain for
the first time the Alumni Section. In
this section it is contemplated that
in each issue there may appear some
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article contributed by an alumnus of
the Law School.
There is a unanimity of opinion
that the first contribution to this
section would most appropriately
and satisfactorily come from the
Founder of the Law School-that is
yourself; that a few lines from your
pen would afford the greatest inter-
est and pleasure possible to the alum-
ni. You are the one man whom ev-
ery alumnus knows and reveres, and
a word from you would supply the
November issue of the Reporter with
its most acceptable feature.
As one of the many alumni who,
have gone out from your school I
think I may fairly speak for them
all in assuring you that a contribu-
tion from your pen would be very
joyfully and gratefully received.
Any article you may choose to sub-
mit, whether personal, reminiscent,
descriptive, advisory or purely legal
in character, will be gladly printed.
May we not receive something from
you by the 15th of November?
With assurances of the Law Fa-
culty's considerations of respect and
particularly of my own sincere per-
sonal regard, permit me to subscribe
myself,
Your grateful alumnus,
FRANCIS J. VURPILLAT,
For the Law Reporter Staff.
To Col. William Hoynes,
Dean-Emeritus, Hoynes College of
Law, Notre Dame University,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
CLASS OF '20 AT THE BAR EX-
AMINATIONS
Their Letters and Reports
Following are the letters and re-
ports of several members of the
Class of '20, coming immediately- aft-
er successful examinations for ad-
mission to the bars of the several
states. They bubble over with genu-
ine enthusiasm, pride, happiness and
gratitude.
ILLINOIS
Chicago, Ill., July 27, 1920
Hon. Frances J. Vurpillat, Dean,
College of Law,
Notre Dame, Ind.
My Dear Judge:
It is my pleasure and also my good
fortune to be able to tell you that I
have just successfully passed the Illi-
nois Bar Examination. The examin-
ations were held on July 13 and 14
ad I just received my notice yester-
day, so you can appreciate how much
relieved I am after two weeks of very
anxious waiting.
Allow me to express to you and to
the faculty of law the gratitude that
I feel for the instruction and prepar-
ation that I received while a student
in the College of Law at Notre Dame.
I assure you that I attribute my suc-
cess entirely to the very able school-
ing and guidance given me by you
and the other members of the law
faculty.
During the days of the examina-
tion I had an opportunity to talk to
men from almost all the big law
schools of the country (450 took the
examination), and I can honestly
say that the impressions I received
conviced me that Notre Dame's
course in law is the most complete
and thorough of them all. The court
work especially is unequalled any-
where and I hope that next year this
part of the work will be carried on
even more -extensively according to
the plans that I know you have for-
mulated for it.
Hoping that you have been enjoy-
ing the summer and that the press of
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law business will not be too heavy to
prevent me fiom running down in
the fall to visit The Hoynes College.
(Little fear of the latter)
I am
Respectfully
Clifford O'Sullivan.
October 18th 1920.
Hon. Francis J. Vurpillat, Dean,
College of Law,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
Dear Judge:
I am enclosing the questions asked
at the recent bar examination held at
Springfield, Ill., on October the 8th
and 9th last. I trust that the same
will give you an idea of the severity
of the test. The Chicago Bar Asso-
ciation recently informed me to the
effect that fifty-two candidates out of
the clhss of two-hundred-ten passed.
I am pleased to state that Notre
Dame went over for a touchdown, for
both Frank Hurley and myself tack-
led the questions with the old school
spirit.
While at the hotel in Springfield
many of the men inquired after the
one session, why the smile? I be-
lieve it followed the session in which
pleadings seemed to be the favorite.
I told them I had a good course in it,
so why shouldn't I give vent to my
feelings. Bets were made at the ho-
tel that I passed.
This firm was extremely pleased
with the outcome, and I was assigned
a case today in which a chorus girl
is my client. I expect to attend the
home-coming game on the sixth of
November and I should like to have
a chat with you. Regards to all the
boys.
Sincerely,
Leo J. Hassenauer.
NEW YORK
455 Fulton Street
Waverly, N. Y. Aug. 14,1920.
Hon. Francis J. Vurpillat, Dean,
Hoynes' College of Law,
University of Notre Dame.
Notre Dame,- Indiana
Dear Judge Vurpillat:
Today I was notified by the State
Board of Law Examiners that I suc-
cessfully passed the bar examinations
held at Albany, N. Y., on June 29th
and 30th. I will be sworn in before
the Court of Appeals at the opening
of the fall term next month.
Judge, let me take this way to
thank you, the other professors in
the law school, and Notre Dame for
the training which enabled me to
pass the bar examination. I can nev-
er speak too highly of the classes at
Notre Dame, and especially of the im-
portance of the work in moot court.
With every good wish, I am
Respectfully yours,
Francis J. Clohessy.
NEW MEXICO
East Las Vegas, N. M.
September 7, 1920.
Judge F. J. Vurpillat,
Notre Dame, Ind.
My Dear Judge:
I take great pleasure in advising
you that I have sucessfully passed
the bar examination in this state.
There were nine aspirants to the le-
gal profession here and five out of
that number failed. The Chairman
of the Board of Examiners informed
me that I have a splendid paper, and
that another young man and I were
tied for first place.
The examination dealt almost en
tirely with substantive law. The sub
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jects of contracts, equity, wills, nego-
tiable instruments, real property, ev-
idence, and common-law pleading,
were the most important, especially
the last, they gave us a thorough ex-
am. on that subject, and I assure you
I did not pass up one question.
I wish to thank you and all the
members of the faculty for the assis-
tance and co-operation and learningi
through which I was enabled to pass
with flying colors. * * * :'
With very best wishes for the con-
tinued success and growth of the
best law school in the country, I am
Very respectfully yours,
L. V. Truder.
INDIANA
Like the Iowa boys, the Indiana
members of the Class of '20, after
successfully passing their final ex-
amination for degree, set out to at-
tain admission to the bars of their
respective courts.
Arthur B. Hunter, Edwin A. Fred-
rickson and Michael Edward Doran,
were examined by the Committee of
the St. Joseph County Bar Associa-
tion at South Bend, Indiana, and
were found worthy of admission to
their Bar Association. That these
men from Indiana are capable of pas-
sing any bar examination in the
States is conceded by the Class of '20
and all who know them.
Francis J. Murphy has successful-
ly passed the examination of the Tip-
pecanoe County Bar Association and
been admitted to the practice at La-
fayette, Indiana.
Harry Richwine has been admitted
to the bar at Anderson, Ind.
A letter of another capable Indiana
boy follows:
September 1, 1920.
Dear Judge:
* * * * I was admitted on the 23rd
July and opened up on the 26th. The
examination committee was one of
the most severe in the county, and
the examination was the hardest giv-
en in many years, according to Judge
John Morris, one of the examiners.
Contrary to the general custom, my
exam. was a written one, and most
peculiar.
There were fourteen questions,
each of which was to be fully brief-
ed, not merely answered, but citing
authority and writing the matter up
in the general form of a brief. I
had, however, the privilege of a li-
brary, the only condition being that
I do the work myself. After they
had been examined, I was told that
only three men had passed that ex-
am. since it has be~n existing form.
These were Judge Vesey, one of the
biggest corporation corporation law-
yers in town, a young man in Vesey's
office, and myself. Besides these vic-
torious three twety-five others have
had the same thing to do, but sorry
to say these men were not successful.
If you desire I will send you a copy
of these questions some time. They
occupied three sheets of legal cap,
single spaced and some of them were
ringers, too. * * * *
Ever sincerely yours,
Lawrence S. Stephan.
IOWA
Immediately after their successful
final examinations for graduation
from the Law School in June, and
before receiving their degrees, Hum-
phrey L. Leslie, Richard B. Swift,
Clement Mulholland and Ralph Berg-
man went to Des Moines, Iowa,
where they took the bar examination.
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From their glowing reports upon
their return to the University, it
seemed these men were as much
"looked up to" and sought out by the
fifty applicants at that examination
as are N. D.'s football team on the
gridiron. They scored very high,
one scoring third, with the others
very close to him. Reports indicate
that the men made themselves and
the University conspicuous. A joint
telegram from Des Moines announc-
ed their success and gave expression
to the quartette's praise of Notre
Dame's College of Law and its course.
A recent letter of Clement Mul-
holland of Fort Dodge, follows:
Fort Dodge, Iowa, August 29.
Dean Francis J. Vuryillat,
University of Notre.
Dear Judge:
I received your letter stating that
you were going to inaugurate an
LL. M. course this coming year and I
regret very much to say that it will
be impossible for me to be with you,
although I would like nothing better
than to go back to the old school and
continue the work under you; but I
have decided to take up banking as
my life work and I figure that the
sooner I get started and get the ac-
tual experience in this new field the
better it will be for me. * * * *
Dick Leslie and "Del" Smith are
the only two members of the class of
1920 that I have kept track of since
leaving Notre Dame. I believe that
they both intend to practice in Des
Moines and no doubt "Del" told you
about his plans while he was at sum-
mer school.
I hope that you are successful in
enrolling a large number of fellows
in this new course * * * * You can
rest assured that I will be an active
campaigner for your law course at
Notre Dame. I just heard the other
day that I got third place in the Bar
exams. in June, and I think that all
the credit should go to the school and
the law faculty. The man who got
first place was a middle aged man
who had been a court reporter or
clerk of court (I forget which) for
about 25 years. The one who got
second place was a girl, the daughter
of the assistant attorney general of
Iowa. I have received no official no-
tice of this but a friend of mine here
in Fort Dodge said that it came out
in the Des Moines Register & Leader
a few days after the examination.
Very sincerely,
Mulholland.
NEW JERSEY
November 8, 1920.
Mr. Francis Vurpillat,
Dean of the College of Law,
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
Dear Sir:
I am enclosing herewith check for
$2.00 for one year subscription to
the Law School Reporter. I was
glad to hear of the publication and I
believe it will do a lot for the Law
School and the University at large.
Everything is running along
smoothly with me; and thanks to the
examination upon which I wasted so
much profanity in 1919, I was able to
pass my Bar Examination at the first
attempt, being one of the 31 per cent.
who were successful on the examin-
ation I took. However, I will expect
to see you in June, and I will tell you
all about it then.
Yours very truly,
Andrew L. McDonough.
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POINTS, PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL, POLITICAL
About the Alumni
Harry H. Kelly, LL.B. '17, at-
tended the home-coming. Harry is
engaged in the practice of the law as
a member of the firm of Kelly & Kelly
of Ottawa, Ill., the other members of
the firm being his father and his
brother, Emmett Kelly, LL.B. '19.
Harry lost his leg in the world war,
from which he was mustered out as
first lieutenant. In the recent elec-
tion Lieutenant Kelly was elected
States Attorney of his district.
The race for prosecuting attorney
in St. Joseph's County, Indiana, in
the recent election was a free-for-all
for the Alumni of the Law School.
In the primary George A. Schock,
LL. B. '17, and Samuel Feiwell, LL.B.
'18, were opposing candidates for the
Democratic nomination, while Floyd
B. JellisQn, LL.B. '15, received the
Republican nomination. Schock was
the successful candidate in the pri-
mary, but in the Republican land-
slide that followed, Jellison was
elected to the office.
Emmett Mulholland, LL.B. '16,
and Clement B. Mulholland, LL.B.
'20, are doing a Land Office business
with offices at 300 Snell Bldg., Fort
Dodge, Iowa. Emmett has engaged
as his chief assistant in the office, at
home and everywhere, his daughter,
born September 21st. The Des
Moines Register and Leader reported
Clement B. Mulholland to have at-
tained third place in the recent bar
examination. Good for two good
boys-men we mean.
Vincent Giblon, LL. B. '18, and Jo-
seph T. Riley, LL.B., '18, shook
hands across the dean's desk in the
Hoynes College of Law on the occa-
sion of their visit at home-coming
time. These are two first magnitude
stars of the constellation of '18. Gib-
lin in the office of the president of the
American Bar Association in Jack-
soville, Fla., while Riley has been
practising law in Grand Rapids and
Muskegon, Michigan. Recently,
however, Riley has been hobnobing
with state and national politicians in
Michigan as a member of the state
republican organization.
Louis Finske, LL.B., '19, has open-
ed law offices in the National Bank
Building, Michigan City, Indiana,
for the general practice of the law in
his home town. Louis is an earnest,
capable and industrious fellow and
will merit success.
Robert C. Carr, Ph.B. and Law,
'17, is practising law as a member of
the firm of Johnson & Carr, Central
Life Bldg., Ottawa, Illinois. Notre
Dame has a large contingent of suc-
cessful lawyers in and about Ottawa.
His brother, Joseph D. Carr, entered
as a law student this year.
Walter L. Clements, LL.B., '18,
finds time apart from his law prac-
tice to launch an agricultural jour-
nal for St. Joseph County, Indiana.
Walter's office is in South Bend.
Henry B. Snyder, LL.B., '15 and
Chas. Patrick Maloney, LL.B., '16 re-
cently formed a partnership for the
practice of law in Gary, Indiana.
Their offices are located at 738 Broad-
way. A good firm and a good field.
William C. Henry, LL.B., '16, a no-
table orator and law student of his
time, visited here during home-com-
ing week. Will is with the firm of
Busby, Weber, Miller & Donovan,
1639 National Bank Bldg., Chicago.
Hugh T. Lavery, LL. B., '19, has
begun the practice of law in Bridge-
port, Connecticut. Hugh was for
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two years a reliable member of the
varsity pitching staff as well as a
successful student of the law.
Thomas J. Hoban, LL.B., '18, one
of the bright lights of his class, has
opened offices foathe practice of law
at 16 Chicago Street, Elgin, Illinois.
Louis H. Hellert, LL.B., '18, has
built up a lucrative law practice for
himself at old Vincennes, Indiana.
His office is in the American Bank
Building.
Arthur J. Hughes, LL.B., '17, was
recently married in Washington, Il-
linois, to Miss Frances Mahle. Mr.
Hughes will be remembered as an ex-
ceptional student, not only of the
law, but of arts as well, from which
department he also took a degree.
When we last heard of Mr. Hughes
he was a successful member of one
of the prominent law firms of Chica-
go. We sincerely wish both Mr.
Hughes and his bride health, wealth
and, happiness.
A law firm which is fast forging
to the front in prominence and recog-
nized ability in Northern Indiaa is
the firm of Vaughan & Vaughan of
Lafayette, Indiana. Charles E.
Vaughan, LL.B., '14, and Vincent D.
Vaughan, LL.B., '17, comprise the
firm. Quite recently Charles E.
Vaughan and Miss Mary A. Reifers
were married in Lafayette. We wish
the law firm continued prominence
and the married firm long life and
happiness.
We have recently received com-
munications from two law men
whose last names in rhyme or asson-
ance gave us no little trouble during
our first semester as a member of
the law faculty. They are George F.
Frantz, LL.B., '17 and Albert J.
Kranz, LL.B. '17. Frantz is a mem-
ber of the law firm of Clementson &
Frantz, Lancaster, Wisconsin. Kranz
has law offices of his own in the
Nicholas Bldg., Toledo, Ohio.
Andrew L. McDonough, LL.B., '18,
who was a long distance runner in
the law course, as well as on the
track, writes an interesting letter
about his bar examination experience
in New Jersey following his profane
experience in the final examination
for degree here. Andrew has suc-
cessfully launched into the practice
of law, with offices in the Babcock
Bldg., Plainfield, N. J.
William E. Bradbury, LL.B., '16,
was a welcome visitor recently. He
is a member of the law firm of Brad-
bury & Bradburry of Robinson, Illi
nois, where William's father has long
been a widely known and honored
member of the Illinois bar. William
himself has come into prominence by
his brilliant and successful conduct
of some important cases. He is a
brother of J. Stanley Bradburry who
is in the second year of the law
course in our Law School.
Associated with their father in the
practice of the law are Joseph B. Mc-
Glynn, LL.B., '12 and Daniel Mc-
Glynn, LL.B., '18. The elder Mc-
Glynn is an old and honored mem-
ber of the Illinois Bar, and together
with the capable and aggressive
young members of the firm, still di-
rects a large and growing practice.
George E. Herbert, LL.B., '18, of
Hoopeston, Illinois, is attaining
prominence and success in the prac-
tice of the law.
Our reporter observed in attendance
on the Notre Dame-Purdue game at
time of the home-coming, the follow-
ing alumni of the Law School: Fran-
cis O'Shaughnessy, '00; Fred L.
Steers, '11, both of Chicago, and
Michael Fansler, '14, of Logansport,
Indiana.
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NEWS OF THE CLASS OF '20
Richard B. Swift writes that he
has begun the "starvation period"
and for that reason could not avail
himself of the proposed LL.M. course.
Dick's office is in the Laurel Build-
ing, Muscatine, Iowa, is the finest in
the city and is already housing a
complete working library. Richard
admits that he has a petition in the
district court, a divorce case set for
trial and the executor of a large es-
tate as a client. Verily, only a
Swift, Richard B., could do so well.
Success will be his.
We have just seen the following
professional card which was clipped
from a local paper: "Francis J. Mur-
phy, Attorney-at-Law, Fourth and
Columbia Streets, Lafayette, Indi-
ana." These are glad tidings from
Murphy of an early and successful
start. We trust he may not be dis-
mayed upon receiving this issue of
the Reporter to learn that his first
appeal to the supreme court has been
lost. Despite his excellent trial and
appellate brief in the case of the St.
Joseph Loan & Trust Company vs.
The First National Bank, the Su-
preme Court of Notre Dame affirm-
ed the decision. Good, Francis J.
Lawrence S. Stephan has opened a
law office for himself 4t 617 Calhoun
St., Fort Wayne, Indiana, and is al-
ready in the active practice. As of-
ficial stenographer of the Notre
Dame Circuit Court, a commence-
ment orator, a business manager of
the 1920 Dome, general utility man,
as well as an excellent student, Ste-
phan's success is assured.
We are informed that Humphrey
L. Leslie and Delbert D. Smith have
decided upon the formation of a part-
nership for the law practice in Des-
Moines, Iowa. We confidently feel
that they will succeed in this ven-
ture as they did at Notre Dame.
Arthur B. Hunter, one of the lead-
ers of the class, is rendering excel-
lent service in the law offices of Mc-
Inernys, Yeagley & McVicker of
South Bend, Indiana. We know this
from a recent talk had with the sen-
ior member of the firm in which he
spoke in terms of the highest praise
of Mr. Hunter's work, ability and
prospects.
Michael Edward Doran, one of the
star men of the class, is maintaining
his law office in the Farmers Trust
Bldg., South Bend, Indiana, and we
know he has made an excellent start
and is doing well.
Edwin A. Fredrickson, one of the
exceptional men of the Law School,
has begun the practice of law in the
office of G. A. Farabaugh of South
Bend, Indiana. His appearance in a
recent trial in the Superior Court
was spoken of in very complimen-
tary terms. Mr. Fredrickson is also
engaged as an instructor in the Law
School, having assigned to him the
subjects of agency, partnership, ne-
gotiable paper and insurance, for a
period of one hour each day for the
year.
Harry Richwine and Maurice F.
Smith have returned for the LL.M.
course.
Harry P. Nester, Walter R. Miller
and Edwin C. Donnelly have qualified
for taking the Ohio bar examination
in December.
Joseph O'Hara is workig in the
law offices of James Hamilton Lewis,
in the Rookery Building, Chicago,
and is preparing to take the Illinois
bar examination next month. Joe
writes: "It gives me great pleasure
to hear of the successes of that fa-
mous class of '20. I think each of
them shares with me the knowledge
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of what we owe to our instructors
during our three years of study, and
I am sure they, not all of course,
will write their names on the scroll
which lies under the title Auccess."
Joe will take the December Illinois
bar examinations.
Francis T. Walsh is in the offices of
the Board of Review of Livingston
County, Pontiac, Illinois. He says
he is studying daily in the law office
and confidently expects to succeed at
December bar examination in Ili-
nois.
The letters of Leo J. Hassenauer,
Lawrence S. Stephan, Clifford O'Sul-
livan, Thomas V. Truder, Clement
Mulholland and Francis J. Clohessy,
which appear in this issue, speak for
themselves of the brilliant successes
of the Class of '20.
Leo J. Ward is reported to be in
the law office of Hon. Joseph Scott,
laetare medalist, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia.
We have no word from Alfonso
Anaya, Emmett Rohyans and George
Murphy.
LAW REPORTER SUBSCRIP-
TIONS
Receipt of two dollars in payment
for the 1920-1921 subscription to the
Law Reporter from each of the fol-
lowing named alumni, is here ac-
knowledged, to-wit: John R. O'Con-
nell, Thomas J. Walsh, James E.
Deery, William P. Breen, Donald M.
Hamilton, Ralph S. Feig, Paul J.
Donovan, Curry & Curry, Harry G.
Hogan, F. Henry Wurzer, Hugh J.
Daley, Fred L. Steers, Joseph B. Mc-
Glynn, Timothy Ansberry, James P.
Fogarty, W. A. Guilfoyle, James L.
Hope, E. P. Carville, Robert C. Carr,
Thomas J. Hoban, Fred L. Maheffey,
Richard B. Swift, Patrick M. Maloy,
William J. Granfield, Henry B. Sny-
der, George F. Frantz, Frank X.
Rydzewski, Vaughan & Vaughan, W.
J. Hines, Wilmer O'Brien, M. J. Mc-
Garry, Clement Mulholland, Andrew
L. McDonnough, William C. Henry,
Louis H. Hellert, John G. Mott of Los
Angeles, Albert J. Kranz, Joseph B.
Murphy.
PROPAGANDA
With the sanction of the Rev.James
A. Burns, C. S. C., President of the
University and with the hearty co-
operation of the Rev. William A.
Maloney, C. S. C., the College of Law
has launched a campaign among its
graduates to secure additional ser-
viceable volumes for the law library.
What the Law School desires particu-
larly just now are the state reports
of the various states up to the point
or number where the West Publish-
ing Company's reporter system takes
them up. Our school is so rapidly
growing into a national school, that
is, with enrollment made up of stu-
dents from so many states of the Un-
ion, that we feel the necessity of hav-
ing the reports, digests, codes of
practice, pleading form books, stat-
utes, etc., of their respective states.
We believe there are hundreds of
volumes of this character on the
shelves of the alumni themselves or
that might be readily picked up,-
books in good second-hand condition,
that have been perhaps replaced with
later editions, such as statutes and
codes, which, when supplemented
with the subsequent acts of the legis-
latures, would serve to good advan-
tage in the law school, and indeed,
not be needed by the alumnus. We be-
lieve that many such valuable vol-
umes might be procured for the Law
School "for a mere song," if only we
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might get to singing. We have al-
ready received the Pennsylvania,
Ohio and the Iowa reports.
The dear alumni can make no mis-
take in sending to the good, old Law
School, their new codes, form books,
and even the first numbers of their
state reports to the point indicated,
for they can readily supply them-
selves with other new volumes. Or,
if they prefer, they might find for us
the good second-hand books as sug-
gested. The city or state alumni as-
sociation of the country can accom-
plish much for the Law School in this
manner through concerted action.
Any of the books here enumerated
will be gladly received or any infor-
mation appreciated which may lead
us to the state reports to be procured.
The donor's name and the donation
will be entered of record in the spe-
cial acquisition book of the law li-
brary kept for the purpose.
GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGE-
MENT
The University and, in particular,
the College of Law, hereby make
grateful acknowledgement to the fol-
lowing Notre Dame lawyers for their
respective gifts to the Law library,
to-wit:
James P. Fogarty, LL.B., 1900, of
Philadelphia, Pa., 109 vols. Pennsyl-
vania State Reports.
John C. Shea, LL.M., '17, of Day-
ton, Ohio, 119 vols. Ohio and Ohio
State Reports.
Richard B. Swift, LL.B., '20, of
Muscatine, Iowa, as principal donor,
with others whose names will be re-
ported later, 110 vols. Iowa Reports.
CONCERNING THE LAW SCHOOL
"The Law School of Notre Dame
University opened auspiciously this
year with an enrollment of two hun-
dred and twenty students coming
from thirty states of the Union, Por-
ta Rico, Chili and the Philippines.
Numerous and important changes
were made in the last year, begin-
ning a new era for the school. The
Hoynes College of Law, a new and
distinctive law building for the ex-
clusive use of the school, was occu-
pied. This is a modern structure
providing four large rooms, library,
court room and three class rooms, all
equipped with American, steel pedes-
tal, tablet arm, chairs.
Col. William Hoynes, for many
years dean of the Law School, has
been proclaimed dean-emeritus and
lecturer on international law. Judge
Francis J. Vurpillat, acting dean for
three years, has been made dean and
continues as professor of constitu-
tional law, procedural law and the
courts. Judge Gallitzen A. Farra-
baugh and Professor John P. Tier-
nan remain with the school. Two
members have been added to the fa-
culty, Asst. Professor, James P. Cos-
tello of Pennsylvania, graduate of
Dickinson Law School, and a prac-
ticing lawyer of twenty years, to
whom has been assigned common-law
actions and forms, contracts and cor-
porations; Edwin A. Fredrickson,
a practicing lawyer of South Bend,
Indiana, a student in the Universi-
ty of Michigan and a graduate of
Notre Dame Law School, who has
been made instructor in agency, part-
nership and negotiable paper.
The four year course has been
modified to prescribe a pre-law year
of college work which is equivalent
of a year and a half of the regular
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arts courses. To the three year
course of law one is eligible who has
attained sophomore standing in any
recognized college. Classes in the
Prniciples of Liability and Study of
Cases have been added to the fresh-
men schedule.
The complete and thorough system
of courts, trial and appellate, inau-
gurated by Judge Vurpillat, has prov-
en a very effective and popular ad-
dition to the school. Another valua-
ble new feature of the school is the
Notre Dame Law Reporter, a quar-
terly fublication launched with the
April and June Numbers. The Re-
porter is devoted to the interests of
the law students and alumni and is
primarily their work. It contains
the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Notre Dame, circuit court court rec-
ords and various other departments.
It contains a law list of Notre Dame
Lawyers -?f the country.
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Of the Notre Dame Law Alumni
In Forwarding Business to a Distant Point Remember Your
Fellow Alumni Appearing in This List.
ARIZONA
Tuscon-
James V. Robins,
107 Melrose St.
ARKANSAS
Little Rock-
Aristo Brizzolara,
217 E. Sixth St.
CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles-
Terence Cocgrove,
1131 Title Insurance Bldg.
John G. Mott, of
Mott & Cross,
Citizens National Bank Bldg.
Michael T. McGarry,
530 Higgins Bldg.
Leo B. Ward,
4421 Willowbrook Ave.
San Francisco-
Alphonsus Heer,
1601 Sacramento St.
COLORADO
Telluride-
James Hanlon
CONNECTICUT
Bridgeport-
Donato Lepore,
645 E. Washington Ave.
Raymond W. Murray,
784 Noble Ave.
Hartford-
James Curry and Thos. Curry, of
Curry & Curry,
D'Esops Bldg., 647 Main St.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Washington-
Timothy Ansberry,
208-12 Southern Bldg.
GEORGIA
Atlanta-
Fay Wood,
225 E. Fourth St.
ILLINOIS
Aurora-
Robert Milroy,
113 Fox St.
Batavia-
Joseph Feldott
Belvidere--
Stephen F. McGonigle,
1011 Whitney St.
Budd-
Arthur B. Hughes
Campus-
Francis T. Walsh
Chicago-
Francis O'Shaughenessy,
10 S. LaSalle St.
Hugh O'Neill,
Conway Bldg.
Charles W. Bachman,
836 W. Fifty-fourth St.
John Jos. Cook,
3171 Hudson Ave.
James V. Cunningham,
1610 Conway Bldg.
Hugh J. Daly,
614 Woodland Park
Leo J. Hassenauer,
1916 Harris Trust Bldg.
William C. Henry,
7451 Buell Ave.
John S. Hummer,
710-69 W. Washington St.
Albert M. Kelly,
2200 Fullerton Ave.
Daniel L. Madden,
Conway Building
Clement C. Mitchell,
69 W. Washington St.
William J. McGrath,
648 N. Carpenter St.
Thos. J. McManus,
5719 Michigan Ave.
John F. O'Connell,
155 N. Clark St.
Joseph P. O'Hara,
1060 The Rookery
Clifford O'Sullivan,
2500 E. Eeventy-fourth St.
Stephen F. Reardon,
405 Peoples Life Bldg.
Francis X. Rydzewski,
8300 Burley Ave.
Delbert D. Smith,
3966 Lake Park Ave.
Fred L. Steers,
1350 First National Bank Bldg.
Max St. George,
108 S. LaSalle St.
Decatur-
William P. Downey,
110 N. Water St.
Dixon-
John Sherwood Dixon,
East Ottowa-
Harry F. Kelly, of
Kelly & Kelly,
Eastwood
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East St. Louis--
Joseph B. McGlynn and Daniel McGlynn,
of McGlynn& McGlynn,
120 N. Main St.
Elgin-
Thos. J. Hoban,
16 Chicago St.
Frank A. McCarthy;
18-14 Elgin National Bank Bldg.
Lawrence McNerney,
Home Bank Bldg.
William Perce,
Opera House Bldg.
Elmer Tobin,
18 Chicago St.
Galesburg-
Hon. Charles Craig
Hoopeston-
George E. Harbert,
827 E. Penn St.
Howard-
Paul J. Donovan
Kewanee-
Thomas J. Welch,
Savings Bank Bldg.
Loda-
Daniel P. Keegan
Mendota-
John W. Dubbs,
Washington St.
Moline-
Peter Meersman,
205 Reliance Bldg.
Matthew McEniry,
408 Peoples Bank Bldg.
Mt. Carmel-
Martin E. Walter,
119 W. Seventh St.
Ottowa-
Robert C. Carr, of
Johnson & Carr,
Central Life Bldg.
John E. Cassidy,
322 E. Superior St.
James J. Conway,
406-7 Moloney Bldg.
Daniel C. Curtis,
519 Guthrie St.
Thomas O'Meara,
Route 27
Thomas O'Meara,
406-7 vtoloney Bldg.
Peoria-
George Sprenger,
Jefferson Bldg.
Polo-
Robert Bracken
Robinson-
William E. Bradbury,
Rochelle-
Thomas F. Healy
First National Bank Bldg.
Rock Island-
Francis A. Andrews,
631 Fifth St.
Springfield-
Thomas Masters
Albert C. Schliff,
918 N. Sixth St.
Streator-
Elmer J. Mohan,
Route No. 3
Woodstock-
Paul Donovan,
Hoy 'Block
INDIANA
Anderson-
Edward C. McMahon,
2004 Fletcher St.
Philip O'Neill,
511-13-15 Union Bldg.
Crawfordsville-
Justin J. Molony,
706 Binford St.
Elkhart-
James S. Dodge,
229-31 Monger Bldg.
Wilmer O'Brien,
325-6 Monger Bldg.
Robert Proctor,
201-5 Monger Bldg.
Fort Wayne-
William P. Breen, of
Breen & Morris,
Peoples Trust Bldg.
Joseph Haley,
202 Shoaff Bldg.
Cornelius B. Hayes,
New Hayes Hotel
Thomas A. Hayes,
501 Bass Block
Frank M. Hogan, of
Colerick & Hogan,
Cor. Court and Berry Sts.
Emmett A. Rohyans,
2725 S. Calhoun St.
Lawrence Stephan,
1431 Hugh St.
Frankfort--
Earl F. Gruber,
Dinwidie Bldg.
Gary-
Henry B. Snyder and Patrick Maloney,
of Snyder & Maloney,
738 Broadway
Indianapolis-
James E. Deery,
316-324 Law Bldg.
Paul J. Smith,
2024 Central Ave.
Kokomo-
George F. Windoffer,
324 W. Jefferson St.
Lafayette-
Francis J. Murphy,
430 S. Third St.
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Chas. E. and Vincent Vaughan, of
Vaughan & Vaughan,
710-711 Lafayette Bldg.
John W. Eggeman,
800 N. Fourth St.
LaGrange-
George D. McDonald,
114 Sixth Ave.
Linton-
Hugh E. Carroll
Marion-
Fred B. Mahaffey,
622 S. Brownson St.
Michigan City-
Lorenzo Glascott,
223 W. Tenth St.
James Kenefick,
Care T. M. J. and J. P. Kenefick
Louis Finski
Mishawaka-
Ralph Feig,
Mishawaka Trust Bldg.
John Schindler,
215 S. Main St.
Montgomery-
Bernard Heffernan,
Route 4
McCordsville-
Harry Kelly
William H. Kelly
South Bend-
Leo J. Cook,
410 Union Trust Bldg.
G. A. Farabaugh and
E. A. Fredrickson,
504 J. M. S. Bldg.
Samuel Feiwell,
404 Citizens Bank Bldg.
Charles Hagerty,
J. M. S. Bldg.
Vernon R. Helman,
R. F. D. 5, Box 18
Patrick Houlihan,
203 Title Bldg.
Arthur B. Hunter,
710 Portage Ave.
Floyd Pellison,
334-36 Farmers Trust Bldg.
Joseph J. Kovacs,
109 N. College St.
Arthur May,
811 J. M. S. Bldg.
Ernest Morris,
Farmers Trust Bldg.
Thomas D. Mott,
522 Farmers Trust Bldg.
William McInerny,
104 Summers Bldg.
William B. O'Neill,
406 Citizens Bank Bldg.
John E. Peak,
224-26 Farmers Trust Bldg.
George W. Sands,
211-12 Convervative Life Bldg.
Armand Schellinger,
415-16 Union Trust Bldg.
George Schock
Samuel Schwartz,
706 J. M. S. Bldg.
Edwin H. Sommerer,
125 N. Francis St.
Vincennes-
Louis H. Hellert,
American Bank Bldg.
IOWA
Carroll-
Joseph J. Meyers,
201 Masonic Temple
Des Moines-
William J. Hynes,
504 Observatory Bldg.
Dubuque-
Patrick J. Nelson,
200-6 Security Bldg.
Fort Dodge-
Michael F. Healy,
605-10 Snell Bldg.
Emmet P. Mulholland, and
Clement B. Mulholland,
300 Snell Bldg.
Ida Grove-
Matthew M. White
Iowa City-
John J. Ney
Lenox-
Eugene F. McEniry
lason City-
John D. Wilson
Muscatine-
Richard B. Swift,
504 Laurel Bldg.
Newton-
Ralph Bergman
Preston-
Harry Godes
Waverly-
Humphrey L. Leslie,
204 S. State St.
KANSAS
Kansas City-
Russell C. Hardy,
812 N. Fifth St.
Thomas V. Holland,
1623 Central Ave.
Theodore J. Lyons,
716 Pyle St.
KENTUCKY
Lebanon-
Samuel J. Spaulding,
Box 585
Samuel T. Spaulding
Owensboro-
Albert Oberst,
Masonic Bldg.
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LOUISIANA
New Orleans--
Patrick E. Burke,
307 Camp
Thomas V. Craven,
305 Wells Fargo Bldg.
MoIASSACHUSETTSBoston-
William P. Higgins,
730 Tremont Bldg.
Springfield-
William J. Granfield
Co' rt Square, Theatre Bldg.
MICHIGAN
Detroit-
Harry Cullen,
1226-30 Dime Bank Bldg.
Daniel Foley,
1626 Penobscot
Thomas A. McLaughlin,
76 Belmont Ave.
Louis C. Wurzer and F. Henry Wurzer,
Wurzer & Wurzer,
910 Majestic Bldg.
Flint-
Vincent D. Ryan,
910 Flint P. Smith Bldg.
Grand Rapids--
Joseph Riley,
236 Valley Ave., N. W.
Jackson-
James G. Henley,
117 W. Pearl
Lansing-
Maurice D. Kirby,
310 Bauch Bldg.
MINNESOTA
Crookston-
Edmund E. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Joseph H. Sylvester,
124 State St.
Duluth-
Thomas McKeon,
817 Torrey Bldg.
Minneapolis--
Edward F. Barrett,
1774 Gerard Ave., S.
St. Cloud-
George L. Murphy,
340 Seventh Ave., S.
MISSOURI
Kansas City-
Leonard M. Carroll,
3117 Flora Ave.
Drexel L. Duffy,
201 Linwood Blvd.
Llewellyn D. James,
323 W. Armour Blvd.
John R. Meyers,
310 Ridge Bldg.
St. Louis--
John L. Corley,
Fullerton Bldg.
MONTANA
Butte-
Timothy Downey,
21 Center St.
Frank C. Walker,
825 W. Quartz St.
John Ward,
28 E. Quartz St.
Galen-
Albert Galen,
Galen Block
Malta-
William McGarry
NEBRASKA
Wahoo-
Frank Kirchman,
Box 337
NEVADA
Elko-
Edmund Carville,
Farrington Bldg.
Reno--
Michael Diskin
NEW JERSEY
Plainfield- N
Andrew L. McDonough,
Bqbcock Bldg.
Rockaway-
Daniel P. Murphy,
Wriebands Corporation
NEW MEXICO
Las Vegas-
Thomas V. Truder,
East Las Vegas
NEW YORK
Albany-
T. Paul MeGannon,
Care Office Attorney-General
Buffalo--
Max G. Kazus,
459 Amherst St.
Geneva-
Francis T. McGrain,
9 State St.
Daniel J. Quinlan,
52 Hallenbeck Ave.
New York City-
Simeon Flanagan,
Care John J. Sullivan,
203 Broadway
Peter McElligott,
428 W. Twenty-fourth St.
Palmyra-
Harold P. Burke
Waverly-
Francis J. Clohessy,
455 Fulton St.
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NORTH DAKOTA
Minot-
George McGee
Park River-
Jacob V. Birder
Rugby-
Thomas Toner,
Main St.
OHIO
Akron-
Clarence May,
427 Second National Bank Bldg.
Walter McCourt,
365 S. Main St.
Cincinnati-
Ernest DuBrue,
835 Beecher Ave.
Cleveland-
1852 Ansell Road
Stanley B. Cofall,
Harry Miller,
Grasselli Chemical Co.
Walter Miller,
318 Leader News Bldg.
James O'Hara,
303 Park Bldg.
Hugh O'Neill,
1934 Euclid Ave.
Columbus-
Donald Hamilton,
801-8 Huntington Bank Bldg.
Dayton-
Thomas Ford,
127 Maple St.
Joseph B. Murphy,
618 Dayton Savings & Trust Bldg.
John C. Shea,
Schwind Bldg.
Hamilton-
Michael O'Burns,
338 S. Second St.
Lancaster-
Michael A. Dougherty,
343 E. Walnut
Harry P. Nester,
156 E. Chestnut St.
Lima-
Francis W. Durbin,
607 Law Bldg.
Maumee-
Peter M. Ragan
Napoleon-
Edwin C. Donnelly,
827 Haley Ave.
Sandusky-
Edmund Savord,
Room 3, Sloan Block
Toledo-
Robert Dederich,
2619 Scottwood
Albert J. Kranz,
116 Nicholas Bldg.
Edwin J. Lynch,
642 Nicholas Bldg.
James T. McMahon,
2916 Collingwooa Ave.
John B. McMahon,
940 Spitzer Bldg.
Arthur W. Ryan,
366 W. Central Ave.
OKLAHOAIA
Tulsa-
Harold R. Delaney,
1412 S. Boulder St.
Leo Holland
Patrick M. Malloy,
1115 Denver St., P. 0. Box 1957
OREGON
Astoria-
James L. Hope,
312-15 Spexarth Bldg.
Independence-
Francis W. Kirkland
Portland-
Roscoe Hurst,
1406 Yeon Bldg.
Frank Lonergan,
816 Electric Bldg.
Roger Sinnott,
Chamber of Commerce
Woodburn-
Stephen Scollard
PENNSYLVANIA
Homestead-
John J. Brislan,
400 McClure St.
Jeanette-
John W. Ely,
601 Germania Bank Bldg.
Johnstown-
John C. Larkin,
322 Wood Ave.
Philadelphia-
James P. Fogarty,
1607-08 Finance Bldg.
Edward Gallagher,
301 E. Lehigh Ave.
George Hanhauser,
401 Market St.
Pittsburgh-
Daniel C. Dillon,
811 Frick Bldg.
Rydal-
Edward Britt
SOUTH DAKOTA
Chamberlain-
Nicholas Furlong
Edgemont-
William A. Guilfoyle
Howard-
Theodore Feyder
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TENNESSEE
Memphis-
Charles McCauley,
383 N. Second St.
TEXAS
Beaumont-
Harry P. Barry,
Stark Bldg.
Sinton-
Bryan Odem,
Sinton State Bank
James F. Odem
WASHINGTON
Centralia-
William Cameron,
304 W. Plum St.
WISCONSIN
Fennimore-
Ralph J. Lathrop
George F. Frantz, of
Clementson & Frantz,
Gravenbrock Bldg..
Green Bay-
John Diener,
Room 1, Parmentier Bldg.
Milwaukee-
Frank Burke,
904 Pabst Bldg.
Joseph E. Dorais,
Belvidere Apt., 58
Thomas C. Kelly,
66 Eighth St.
Chgauncey Yockey,
514 Wells Bldg.
Edward Yockey,
Merchants & Farmers Bank Bldg.
Neelsville-
George A. Frantz
Plymouth-
Gilbert P. H~and,
105 Milwaukee St.
Racine-
Grover F. Miller,
1116 College Ave.
Sparta-
Johin P. Doyle,
508 S. Water St.
Superior-
Sherman May,
2016 Hammond St.
CUBA
Ceinfuegos-
Andrew Castille,
Box 505
M1EXICO
Mexico City-
Alfonso Anaya,
Qa, Apartado 52
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Beinaton Union-
Bernardo Lopez
Manila-
Jose Manuel Gonzales
Turlac, Tarlac-
Jose Urquico
Misamia .Province-
Emilio Aranus
Sorsogen-
Doroteo Amador
